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REMEDY REALITIES IN BUSINESS-TO-
CONSUMER CONTRACTING
Amy J. Schmitz*
Professor Jean Braucher greatly contributed to the exploration of consumer and
contract law by questioning how the law operates in the real world and
highlighting the importance of "law in action." In recognition of that contribution,
this Article focuses on law in action with respect to consumers' quest to obtain
remedies regarding their business-to-consumers ("B2C") contracts. Currently,
consumers often have no practical recourse with respect to B2C purchase
problems due to the complexity, cost, and inconvenience of the processes for
obtaining remedies. Accordingly, stated legal rights become meaningless for
individuals living in the real world. This Article, therefore, explores access to
consumer remedies and proposes ideas for expanding that access through
development offair and efficient online dispute resolution ("ODR") processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumers continually make small-dollar purchases through business-to-
consumer ("B2C") contracts, usually without incident. Occasionally, however, the
goods and services that consumers purchase do not fulfill their expectations.
Purchased products may never arrive or quickly malfunction, and service providers
may perform poorly. When this happens, consumers often lack information about
their rights and do not know where to turn for assistance regarding their purchase
problems. Furthermore, even when consumers understand their rights, they may
lack the resources or confidence to pursue processes for obtaining assistance. This
is especially true for consumers with lower status, education, or income.
Professor Jean Braucher highlighted this lack of awareness and access
with respect to consumer remedies in her consideration of "law in action" and
urged that the law should move beyond bravado to provide real relief for all
individuals.1 Professor Braucher emphasized that common-law contract remedies
are inadequate to protect consumers' expectation interests, especially in light of
litigation costs. 2 Over 30 years ago, Professor Braucher criticized the "legal-
rights" framework for understanding consumer warranty claims and the prohibitive
costs of related litigation.3 She emphasized that a majority of product defects go
unnoticed and as many as two-thirds of perceived defects go unreported.4
In an ideal world, all consumers would understand their rights and have
easy access to remedies when they have problems with B2C purchases. Instead,
the world is less than ideal. Consumers usually do not realize they have rights.
They often feel helpless in seeking remedies even when they realize their rights.
Furthermore, businesses have cut back customer service, and have cut off
1. Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection,
7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 107-08 (2012).
2. William C. Whitford, Jean Braucher's Contracts World View, 58 ARIz. L.
REv. 13, 18 (2016) (noting how Professor Braucher emphasized that the costs of litigation
may effectively preclude a consumer from even defending against a collection action
initiated by a business).
3. Jean Braucher, An Informal Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 1405, 1405-06, 1413-47.
4. Id. at 1450-60 (further explaining how few consumers seek remedies and
proposing an informal resolution model adopting a warranty disclosure approach that
regulates warranties "only to the extent necessary" to make clear disclosure possible).
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consumer access to judicial relief through one-sided form contracts with arbitration
clauses that preclude class relief of any kind. This often leaves consumers with no
practical process for obtaining remedies with respect to small-dollar claims. For
example, a consumer generally will not pursue a claim regarding a $500 cell phone
if that means she must pay the nonrefundable $200 filing fee required to initiate
arbitration with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). That is especially
true when one considers the consumer's time, travel, and attorney costs. 6
The U.S. Supreme Court has reinforced strict enforcement of these
arbitration and class waiver provisions. Some scholars have argued that this
jurisprudence threatens to erode public awareness of their rights and enforcement
of substantive consumer-protection law. This is because the Court's endorsement
of arbitration clauses ignores whether enforcement will help streamline
proceedings or thwart reasonable means for asserting claims. 9 The current
interpretation of arbitration and class waiver provisions essentially incentivizes
businesses to use procedural provisions to escape the public eye of the courts and
class actions. 10
That is not to say that public litigation is an ideal avenue for the
vindication of consumer rights. As Professor Braucher noted, litigation also
generally fails to pave an economically practical and satisfying way for consumers
to obtain remedies regarding purchases. " Any such formalized face-to-face
("F2F") processes for pursuing remedies are usually too complex and expensive
for resolving consumers' relatively small claims related to typical household
5. Arbitration clauses are not necessarily unfair to consumers and some
companies reimburse consumers' arbitration costs. For example, Amazon uses a binding
arbitration clause with a class action waiver, but the company allows for a telephonic
hearing and will reimburse consumers for all fees on claims of $10,000 or less unless the
arbitrator deems the claim "frivolous." Conditions of Use, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?nodeld=508088 (last visited Feb.
28, 2016).
6. According to the AAA, a consumer must pay a nonrefundable filing of $200
in full when filing a claim, unless the parties' agreement provides that the consumer pay
less. Costs of Arbitration (Including AAA Administrative Fees), AM. ARB. Ass'N,
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTAGE2026862 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016)
(also noting that there are additional fees for an in-person hearing ($500 plus room rental),
but the AAA says these fees are to be paid by the business).
7. AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743-56 (2011);
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773-77 (2010); Rent-A-
Ctr. W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-80 (2010).
8. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3075-84 (2015).
9. See id. at 3070.
10. Id. at 3080-82; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw. L. REv.
87, 94-98 (2012) (noting the prevalence and danger of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts).
11. Braucher, supra note 3, at 1410-13.
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purchases.12 Most consumers do not have the resources, education, confidence, or
general inclination to pursue such procedures. 13
As a result, consumers usually do nothing or occasionally seek a remedy
through more informal private processes.14 As I have argued, this privatization of
B2C claims resolution has allowed a "squeaky wheel system" ("SWS") to develop
in which only the most sophisticated squeaky wheels are sufficiently proactive in
pursuing their complaints to get the limited assistance, remedies, and other benefits
that companies are not eager to provide. Meanwhile, the majority of consumers
remain silent because they lack the knowledge, experience, or resources to artfully
and actively pursue their interests. 16 As a result, the individuals who already enjoy
disproportionate bargaining power due to social or economic status are usually the
squeaky wheels that receive the benefits-thus perpetuating the divide between the
consumer "haves" and "have-nots." 17 Furthermore, privately satisfying the
informed squeaky-wheel consumers with rationed remedies may prevent these
consumers from leading class actions or otherwise informing the majority about
purchase problems.
As Professor Braucher suggested in her work, the costs and complexities
of remedy processes create a need for consumer protections that make rights real
when viewed in action.19 This Article builds on this inspiration in highlighting the
dysfunctions in consumer-remedy systems and advocating for expanded processes
to make rights and remedies real for consumers. Specifically, this Article considers
how online dispute resolution ("ODR") systems could provide expanded access to
remedies with respect to typical consumer purchase problems. ODR utilizes the
Internet and computer-mediated communication ("CMC") to provide cost-
effective negotiation, mediation, and arbitration processes for resolving complaints
without the need for costly travel or other stresses and complications of F2F or
12. See id.
13. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday
Problems and Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVEs: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS
112-32 (Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds., 2007) (highlighting how shame, a sense of insufficient
power, fear, gratitude, and frustrated resignation stops individuals from asserting their
claims).
14. See id. at 112-14.
15. Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel
System, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 279, 280 (2012) [hereinafter Schmitz, Squeaky Wheel System].
16. See id. at 282-83.
17. See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 879, 895-96 (2008) (discussing how businesses may discriminate in
favor of sophisticated consumers); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and
Segmentations: Separating Consumer "Haves" from "Have-Nots," 2014 MICH. ST. L. REv.
1411, 1411-74 [hereinafter Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores] (exploring how Big Data has
been used by businesses to determine what contracts and benefits to provide to consumers,
thereby perpetuating contractual discrimination).
18. Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., Offers of Judgment in Class Action Cases: Do
Defendants Have a Secret Weapon?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 283, 283 (2000); David
Hill Koysza, Preventing Defendants from Mooting Class Actions by Picking off Named
Plaintiffs, 53 DUKE L.J. 781, 789 (2003).
19. Braucher, supra note 3, at 1405-10.
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telephonic processes. ODR can ameliorate the negative impacts of the SWS by
lowering the costs of pursing complaints so that all consumers-regardless of
power and resources-feel comfortable and able to seek assistance.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article describes legal limitations consumers
face when seeking remedies on their small dollar claims, paying particular
attention to the rise of arbitration clauses and class action waivers. Part II then
explains "life" limitations that hinder most consumers from pursuing their rights
and incentivize businesses to treat consumers differently because of their
resources, status, or education. These parts highlight how arbitration clauses and
class action waivers converge with the realities of human and business
predilections to curtail consumers' access to meaningful remedies. Part III then
suggests means for addressing this lack of access to remedies through the
development of ODR systems that assist consumers with purchase problems
regardless of their wealth, educational, or other social status. Part IV concludes by
inviting action in advancing such ODR systems.
I. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS TO REMEDIES
Courts, regulators, and lawmakers generally focus on formalistic contract
enforcement and promotion of market efficiency, which weigh against substantive
regulations that may interfere with freedom of contract.20 This has largely limited
consumer protections to disclosure rules that preserve businesses' power to dictate
contract terms as long as they provide sufficient notice of provisions with
particular impact on consumers' rights. Allegiance to freedom of contract also has
led to strict enforcement of arbitration clauses that businesses may use to cut off
consumers' access to class relief, which may be their only practical means for
asserting small-dollar claims. This combination of limited consumer protection
regulations and strict enforcement of arbitration has arguably promoted market
efficiency by allowing businesses to rely on form contracts and save on dispute
resolution costs. This combination, however, is problematic when it precludes
consumers from vindicating their rights and jeopardizes enforcement of consumer
law.
A. Resistance to Substantive Consumer Protections
Classical contract doctrine prefers formulistic disclosure rules to
incentivize individuals to read their contracts and responsibly protect themselves.2 1
This doctrine counseled against substantive consumer protections to foster
20. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 1697, 1721-25 (1996) (arguing that incorporation of unwritten norms in contracts
may foster inefficiency); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847 (2000) (proposing that strict enforcement better maximizes parties'
value than more flexible relational methodology).
21. See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive:
Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Bus. 617, 619-23 (2000) (discussing courts' strict enforcement of form contracts in
rejecting fraud challenges of contracts containing disclaimer clauses).
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22
certainty, long-term planning, and an optimal allocation of resources. Adherents
to classical contract doctrine assume that buyers and sellers make rational
contracts that include efficient and interest-maximizing contract terms.
Furthermore, they presuppose healthy competition among sellers that are
23
concerned about their reputations.
Law and economics scholars focus on cost-benefit analysis as promoting
market efficiency. They argue that cost-benefit analysis is generally applicable in
any purchase context, even B2C contexts.24 Furthermore, they suggest that cost-
benefit analysis is the most effective means for assessing regulations because it
25
relies on available market data and monetary valuations. Law and economics
scholars therefore warn that substantive consumer protection reforms based on
26
expert judgments would create market inefficiencies and reduce transparency.
Classical contract theorists and economists who focus on efficiency also
worry that substantive consumer protection regulations may lead to an
unpredictable enforcement of contracts and may cause merchants to avoid
transactions with those likely to challenge adhesive contracts.2 7 They also argue
that businesses will pass on contract litigation costs to consumers through
increased prices and decreased quality of goods and services.28 They posit that
strict enforcement of boilerplate contract terms benefits all consumers regardless
of their adhesive nature because standardization of contracts lowers transaction
costs and fosters efficiency.29
Some law and economics scholars criticize any substantive regulations
that arguably impede freedom of contract.30 They argue that such regulations may
require banks and businesses to take on the extra costs of measures, including
assessing borrowers' subjective contractual expectations.31 They also suggest that
government enforcement of new substantive regulations results in taxpayer costs
22. See Brian Bix, Epstein, Craswell, Economics, Unconscionability, and
Morality, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 715, 717 (2000) (noting law and economics theorists'
suggestion that presumed enforcement of "adhesion contracts" may be in "the long-term
interests of those who sign them").
23. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function,
58 ALA. L. REv. 73, 79-82 (2006) (discussing formalistic application of contract defenses).
24. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial




28. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 429 (2002).
29. Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1403-04, 1433-55 (2009) (arguing that consumers prefer
standardized contracts over spending time negotiating individualized terms, and that
standardization allows for innovation); Andrew Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges
and the Problem ofAdhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 354-57 (2011).
30. Jeffrey P. Naimon et al., Caveat Emptor or Caveat Vendor? The Evolution of
Unfairness in Federal Consumer Protection Law, 132 BANKING L.J. 3, 4 (2015).
31. Id. at 16 (discussing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer




that outweigh any benefit that such regulations provide consumers. Such scholars
thus conclude that the costs to impose new regulations on businesses exceed the
benefit.33
Following this logic, both classical and law and economics contract
theorists have continued to endorse limited disclosure rules. This is largely
because, in their opinion, disclosure bolsters freedom of contract by giving
consumers an opportunity to review contract terms before consenting.
Proponents of disclosure rules suggest that these rules should bolster contractual
consent, thereby adding justification for strict contract enforcement. 36 Such
disclosure rules also may help eradicate abusive practices without the costs of
more substantive prohibitions on contract terms.
The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of
2009 ("CARD Act") is an example of a disclosure-focused law.3 7 Although the
CARD Act contains some substantive protections, it has gained prominence for
requiring simple disclosures to credit card holders that mimic those of the so-called
"Schumer Box" that requires lenders to succinctly state key loan terms in credit
applications and solicitations under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). 38
Specifically, the CARD Act provisions impose disclosure requirements with
respect to payment amounts, due dates, rates, and fees. 3 9 The CARD Act has been
somewhat successful in protecting consumers from unwanted fees and interest, but
it is unclear whether the disclosure or substantive aspects of the law have been
more beneficial.4 0
32. Id. at 17-18 (citing Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Am. Debt
Settlement Solutions, No. 9:13-cv-80548-DMM (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2013), ECF No. 1
(alleging abusive practices in offering debt relief services) and Complaint, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2013), ECF No. 1,
2014 WL 10321537 (alleging CashCall's attempts to collect on loans that were fully or
partially void under state usury laws rose to the level of an abusive practice) as examples of
such government enforcement action).
33. Id. at 18-20.
34. See generally Fairfield, supra note 29, at 1422-23.
35. See generally id.
36. See generally id.
37. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-24, 124 Stat. 1743 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1637(b) (2012); Braucher supra note 1, at 117-19 (but noting how CARD Act's
substantive protections are promising because businesses tend to avoid violating specific
commands).
38. See, e.g., Owen Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act
and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 967 (2012); Jim Hawkins, The CARD Act on Campus,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1471 (2012); Brandon Mohr, Who Decides Whether Clarity Is
Clear?: An Analysis of TILA's Clarity of Disclosure Requirement in Actions by Consumers
Against Creditor Card Companies, 32 PACE L. REv. 188, 215 (2012) (discussing the
requirements of the Schumer Box).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b) (2012).
40. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CARD ACT REPORT: A REVIEW OF THE
IMPACT OF THE CARD ACT ON THE CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET (2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb-card-act-report.pdf.
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Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act ("Dodd-Frank") seeks to increase transparency in the market for consumer
financial services by requiring additional disclosures in financial dealings.41 Dodd-
Frank also gives the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") rulemaking,
supervisory, and enforcement powers and allows for dual state and federal
42
enforcement. This has opened the door to more substantive consumer protection
regulations aimed to address "unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts, and practices.
For example, the CFPB has promulgated substantive limits on checking account
overdraft charges that protect consumers from abusive bank practices.44
However, the CFPB has limited resources for enforcement actions and
state attorneys general have done little to implement their new powers under
Dodd-Frank.4 5 Consumers continue to carry the burden to learn about their rights
and proactively pursue processes for obtaining remedies. Although enhanced
disclosures help justify contract enforcement, they generally do little to advance
consumers' access to remedy processes. Current law leaves consumers with
traditional tort- and contract-based solutions that are not well suited for small-
dollar claims.4 6
B. Proliferation of Arbitration Clauses Precluding Class Proceedings
Adherence to freedom of contract and reluctance by legislatures to enact
more substantive consumer protections have hindered movements to bar
enforcement of arbitration clauses. Instead, arbitration clauses have become
common in B2C contracts, thereby preventing consumers from litigating claims in
court.48 Furthermore, B2C contract clauses generally preclude class relief of any
41. Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys
GeneralAfter Dodd-Frank, 99 IOwA L. REv. 115, 126, 140-41 (2013).
42. Id. at 127-28.
43. See id. at 131-54.
44. Dan Rutherford, Consumer Advisory: You've Got Options When It Comes to
Overdraft, CFPB BLOG (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/consumer-
advisory-youve-got-options-when-it-comes-to-overdraft/ (discussing overdraft protections);
see also Kelley Holland, CFPB Fines Regions Bank for Illegal Overdraft Fees, CNBC
PERs. FIN. (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/28/cfpb-fines-regions-bank-for-
illegal-overdraft-fees.html (noting CFPB action against illegal overdraft charges).
45. Braucher, supra note 1, at 110, 128 (highlighting the importance of CFPB
follow-through as a means for protecting consumers from lenders' exploitative marketing
and products); Totten, supra note 41, at 168-71 (arguing that dual enforcement could: (1)
cure federal agency inaction; (2) increase democratic participation and accountability; (3)
strengthen federal separation of powers; (4) facilitate the "states as laboratories of
democracy" power; and (5) give states power they would not otherwise have under state
law).
46. See Braucher, supra note 1, at 118-25 (noting need for more substantive
protections regarding reckless credit extensions).
47. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIz. L. REv. 161,
197 (2015) (noting that legislation to save class actions from business-friendly Supreme
Court interpretations of federal arbitration law is unlikely to pass).
48. Id. at 164-70, 192 (discussing Supreme Court decisions that have upheld the
enforceability of class action waivers, and noting that 50% of credit card users and 40% of
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kind, which is often consumers' only economically feasible means for seeking
relief on their small-dollar claims.4 9
1. Strict Enforcement of Individualized Arbitration
Arbitration clauses precluding class relief pervade B2C contracts. For
example, one study indicates that roughly 75% of financial services and
telecommunications consumer contracts contain arbitration clauses, and all of
these contracts include class action waivers.5o As one scholar surmised, "Based on
studies, anecdotes, and back of the envelope calculations, it seems that reasonable
people could agree there are lots and lots of mandatory consumer arbitration
contracts in the United States at present." 5 1
The growth of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts flows from the
U.S. Supreme Court's application of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") to
mandate strict enforcement of arbitration clauses. Furthermore, the Court
reinforced this mandate in a string of recent decisions including American Express
v. Italian Colors Restaurant; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp.; AT&T
Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion; and Rent-A-Center v. Jackson. 52 The Court
condoned class waivers with respect to statutory rights in American Express, and
significantly narrowed arbitrators' power to order class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. and AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. 53 Furthermore, the Court in Rent-A-Center
emphasized that courts may only consider contract challenges that target the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement itself, and sanctioned provisions that
allow arbitrators to determine the validity and scope of their own jurisdiction.5 4
Prior to these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court had endorsed arbitration of
statutory claims unless a statute expressly precludes arbitration or there was strong
evidence that arbitration would severely hinder the statute's purpose. It therefore
condoned arbitration of a broad range of statutory claims extending to employment
checking account users were bound by such class action waivers, according to a 2012 CFPB
report).
49. Id. at 164-97.
50. Sternlight, supra note 10, at 94-98 (noting a study by other researchers who
question the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts).
51. Id. at 98. But see Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and
Choice, 2013 BYU L. REv. 1, 8 (2013) (challenging reports of rampant arbitration clauses in
B2C contracts).
52. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T
Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Rent-A-Ctr. W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
53. See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2304-10 (enforcing a class waiver in
arbitration clauses with respect to antitrust claims); AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct at 1748-53
(stating that class-wide arbitration is inconsistent with the FAA); Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S.
Ct. at 1773-76 (holding a party cannot be compelled under the FAA to class arbitration
unless contractual basis indicating parties agreed to class arbitration).
54. See Rent-A-Ctr., 130 S. Ct. at 2777-80 (holding a clause in an employment
contract delegating to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide enforceability of the
arbitration agreement was a valid delegation under the FAA).
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discrimination, consumer lending, and securities fraud. 5 Furthermore, courts have
uniformly held that arbitration of statutory claims does not constitute state action
subject to constitutional due process requirements.56 Most courts also construe
arbitration clauses broadly to cover tort and statutory claims, regardless of whether
5,7
a clause gives express notice of such broad coverage.
In addition, consumers must overcome a high threshold to satisfy the
burden set by the Supreme Court in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph of proving
that arbitration costs effectively prohibit claimants from vindicating their statutory
58
rights. In that case, the Court found that the consumer claimants failed to prove
that their inability to pay arbitration costs would preclude them from vindicating
their rights under TILA because the claimants had not established their lack of
sufficient financial resources to pay the arbitration costs. 59 The Court was
persuaded by the arbitrators' discretion to limit or excuse fees for consumers
unable to pay costs. Further, a footnote in the opinion seemed to give credence to
the lender's offer during oral arguments to pay arbitration costs if they proved
prohibitive to the customer.60 The opinion left claimants in the awkward position
of having to shoulder upfront fees to arbitrate in hopes of recouping those costs
through an award or post-hoc business offer to pay fees.
This pro-enforcement jurisprudence has since led the Court to deny a
similar claim of prohibitive costs in American Express v. Italian Colors
55. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000) (finding
TILA claims may be subject to binding arbitration under the FAA); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1989) (overruling prior opinion to hold
securities claims arbitrable).
56. See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional
Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1711, 1714-23, 1745-62
(2006) (arguing that private arbitration does not involve state action with respect to arbitral
class actions).
57. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 620, 624-26 (1991)
(finding statutory age discrimination claim could be subject to arbitration, explaining that
arbitration clauses are little more than specialized forum-selection clauses).
58. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91-92 (2000) (finding that although Randolph had
provided information regarding high AAA arbitration fees and costs, it was not clear that
she would bear these costs and that she could not pay them).
59. Id.
60. See id.; Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argumentjtranscripts/99-1235.pdf. Although
it is laudable for businesses to offer to pay such costs, such post-hoc offers allow them to
avoid changing their contracts ex ante, thus reserving the benefits of such assistance to only
those who expend resources and time to challenge cost provisions. See also James v.
McDonald's Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 675-80 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing that consumers
would have to show that arbitration was truly more expensive than litigation in terms of
overall costs); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003)
(finding cost challenge of arbitrability was for the arbitrator under the parties' agreement);
Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847-48 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(stating that the court would reconsider its ruling denying enforcement of an arbitration
clause due to high costs if the defendants agreed to pay these costs).
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Restaurant.6 1 In that case, a would-be class of small businesses asserted antitrust
violations against the credit card company for allegedly charging excessive fees
and claimed that the class waiver in their arbitration agreements made it too
expensive for them to vindicate their statutory rights. The businesses argued that
they could not pay the expert fees and related costs of proving antitrust violations
62
unless they banded together. However, the Court denied the class consolidation,
emphasizing that complainants have no right to an economical or streamlined
63
means for asserting antitrust violations. The Court also indicated a distaste for
class arbitrations, which it believes frustrate the efficiency goals of the FAA.
Two years earlier, the Court had questioned class arbitration in narrowing
arbitrators' power to order class relief in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int'l
Corp.65 In that case, arbitrators ordered class arbitration of customers' antitrust
claims against several large shipping companies where the contract between the
66
shipping companies and their customers lacked a class waiver clause. The Court
quashed that order, holding that the arbitration panel had "imposed its own
conception of sound policy" and exceeded its authority under the FAA by ordering
67
class arbitration. Nonetheless, the Court most recently declined to invalidate the
class arbitration in Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v. Sutter, another case in which the
arbitration clause was silent on class proceedings.6 8
However, most B2C contracts now expressly preclude class proceedings
in the wake of AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, which severely narrowed
consumers' power to challenge class waivers based on traditional contract
defenses. 6 9 The AT&T court held that the FAA preempts a state court from using
unconscionability to condition enforcement of an arbitration clause on preserving
70
consumers' ability to bring class-wide arbitration. Consumers in that case filed a
class action lawsuit against AT&T, alleging that it fraudulently advertised free
61. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2304-10 (2013).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Glover, supra note 8, at 3070-84 (arguing that the Court's
arbitration jurisprudence has undermined public justice).
65. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
66. Id. at 1768-70.
67. Id. at 1769-77.
68. Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2065-75 (2013); see
also Fenterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 132-39 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
Stolt-Nielsen did not preclude the court from holding the class waiver unconscionable, but it
did bar the court from severing the waiver to enforce class arbitration); Discover Bank v.
Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (holding class action waiver unenforceable where it
targeted small consumer claims); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 18-24
(Mo. 2010) (finding that Stolt-Nielsen requires courts to strike arbitration clauses entirely
where courts find a class waiver unenforceable under contract law); Gentry v. Super. Ct.,
165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007) (holding class action waiver in arbitration agreement
unenforceable under California law).
69. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 51, at 38 ("Of the arbitration clauses in the
sample [of credit card agreements], forty-four of forty-seven clauses (or 93.6%) (covering
99.9% of the credit card loans outstanding) waived any right to class arbitration.").
70. AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743-56 (2011).
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phones despite its inclusion of phone costs and taxes in monthly service charges.7 1
The AT&T consumers' standard cellular phone agreements included an arbitration
clause that precluded arbitrators from ordering class relief or consolidation, but
allowed for small claims court actions, recovery of double attorney fees if an
award exceeded the company's settlement offer, and the company's payment for
all arbitration costs.72 The California court struck down the class waiver because
the waiver effectively "cheat[ed] large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money." 73 However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and
admonished California's use of state contract law to hinder enforcement of class
74
waivers.
The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence-reinforcing strict enforcement
of arbitration-threatens public justice. Public litigation brings light to policy
issues and aids development of the law. However, the Court's decisions shifting
away from public dispute resolution toward private arbitration threaten these
important functions. Strict enforcement of arbitration clauses allows private
entities to define their own dispute resolution processes, thus gaining quasi-
lawmaking powers that significantly decrease the compensatory and public
deterrent objectives of consumer protection laws.76
2. Limited Utility ofArbitration for Consumers
In the years since AT&T and Stolt-Nielsen, the filings of new class
arbitrations have "almost completely dried up" according to one arbitration
scholar.7 7 Class arbitrations with the AAA reached a high of 57 cases in 2006, but
fell to 9 by the first half of 2012.78 Furthermore, Stolt-Nielsen had a particular
impact on class arbitration in the eight months following that decision-only one
new class action arbitration case appeared on the AAA website, and the parties in
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1747-58.
74. See id. at 1748-55 (emphasizing that class action arbitration sacrifices
informality, a major advantage of arbitration, and that class action arbitration rules, unlike
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are ill-suited to protect defendants in class litigation
because they do not provide the same appellate review); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, On
Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent
Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. REv. 457, 481-91 (2011) (highlighting how recent
Supreme Court opinions curtail class action relief).
75. Glover, supra note 8, at 3052.
76. Id. at 3054. Professor Glover thus concluded: "In allowing arbitration to
expand with so few restraints, we have arguably privatized both the public realm and the
substantive law into oblivion." Id. at 3092. But see Andrew Schwartz, Arbitration and the
Contract Exchange, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 299, 311-14 (2014) (arguing utility of
arbitration for exchange-traded contracts).
77. Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REv. 1103,
1157 (2011).
78. Gregory A. Litt & Tina Praprotnik, After Stolt-Nielsen, Circuits Split, but
AAA Filings Continue, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., July 2012, at 22.
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that case had filed that case the day before the Stolt-Nielsen ruling.7 9 Indeed, class
arbitrations are rare.so
It would not be surprising for businesses to eliminate almost all consumer
class actions through use of arbitration clauses and class relief waivers. 81 Many
businesses insist upon these clauses in all of their contracts with their customers,
employees, and other businesses.82 They surmise that the streamlined processes in
arbitration are more efficient than traditional litigation and prefer to eliminate class
actions through pre-dispute contractual terms. 8 3
E-contracts in particular have become notorious for incorporating
arbitration clauses with class waivers. One recent study analyzed terms of service
for the 100 most-visited websites as of October 2013 and found that 30%
contained arbitration clauses. 84 Sixty-three percent of arbitration clauses were
mandatory; the clauses explained only a limited number of the users' rights, and
the average clause appeared near the end of these multi-page click-wrap
agreements. Additionally, 40% of the clauses did not mention that the user was
waiving other remedies, 67% contained class action waivers, and 70% did not
address how to initiate an arbitration proceeding.8 6
Consumers' lack of understanding and comfort with arbitration hinders
them from filing arbitration claims when disputes arise. 8 7 For example, a CFPB
report revealed that none of the millions of Wachovia customers who complained
about the bank's overdraft fees filed an arbitration claim in accordance with the
arbitration clause in their contracts. Instead, most of the customers did nothing
79. Id.; see Garrett-Scheirer v. Muller Auto. Grp., No. HNT-L-135-10, 2010 WL
1599419 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 16, 2010).
80. See Claudia Pharaon, The Extent of Arbitrators' Power to Order Class
Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT'L 589 (2015),
http://arbitration.oxfordjournals.org/content/31/4/589.full-text.pdf.
81. Fitzpatrick, supra note 47.
82. Id. at 164.
83. Id. at 164-74.
84. James R. Bucilla, II, The Online Crossroads of Website Terms of Service
Agreements and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in the
Terms of Service Agreements for the Top 100 Websites Viewed in the United States, 15
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 102, 106 (2014) (citing October 2013 figures from Alexa).
85. Id. at 114-20.
86. Id. at 120-25. Forty percent did not address responsibility for cost, while
another 40% provided that AAA rules govern cost. Id. at 126. However, other researchers
have found that consumer arbitration clauses often include features that are favorable for
consumers. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 51. These prominent arbitration scholars
found in their study of arbitration clauses in 2009-2010 outstanding consumer credit
contracts, that nearly 70% contained small claims carve outs-although 98-99% also
employed class waivers. Id. at 20-45. In addition, they argued that their overall data
suggested that arbitration clauses are not more pervasive in B2C contracts than they are in
business-to-business ("B2B") contracts. Id. at 45-55.
87. Aaron Blumenthall, Circumventing Concepcion: Conceptualizing Innovative
Strategies to Ensure the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws in the Age of the
Inviolable Class Action Waiver, 103 CALIF. L. REv. 699, 700-14 (2015).
88. Id.
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about their claims. 89 At most, the more proactive consumers will contact a
company's customer service department or post negative reviews on the Internet,
but very few will take their grievances beyond this point.90
Legal economists may argue that curtailing public legal action is
beneficial to the extent that it generates cost savings that companies may pass on to
consumers through lower prices and better products and services. 91 Public
litigation, however, is often necessary to uncover purchase problems. 92
Furthermore, class actions allow consumers to assert their typically small-dollar
claims in an economical manner. 93 The class action mechanism also may allow
consumers to act as "private attorney generals" in enforcing consumer protections
in cases when regulators lack the resources to bring enforcement actions. 94
C. Cautions on Class Actions and Other Complaint Processes
Class actions aim to efficiently compensate victims, deter bad conduct,
and promote judicial economy. 95 Unfortunately, the limited data available suggests
that only a small percentage of claimants actually file claims and receive just
compensation from class action settlement funds. 96 Additionally, complex class-
certification rules and confusing jurisprudence regarding class procedures have
hindered the efficiency and deterrence goals of class actions. 97 In addition, as
Professor Braucher noted 30 years ago, multistate class actions are often
unrealistic in B2C cases because consumers usually do not perceive their purchase
problems in legal terms or report them to a lawyer-suggesting a need for more
informal remedy mechanisms better suited for resolving common B2C
complaints. 98
At the same time, conflicts of interest between class attorneys and class
members threaten the prospect that class members will actually receive the relief
89. See generally id.
90. Id. at 714.
91. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM.
ARB. 251, 254-64, 292 (2006) (proposing that pre-dispute arbitration clauses benefit
companies and consumers).
92. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal
Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 1087, 1093-97 (1999) (noting how public
litigation can stimulate legal development and public debate through recorded opinions).
93. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them:
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 399-418 (2014).
94. See Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumers' Warranty Woes Through Regulated
Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 627, 635-45 (2008) (discussing functions of
class actions).
95. Mullenix, supra note 93, at 399-418.
96. Id. at 418-27 (also explaining how class notices may disclose the total
amount received through settlement but provide no information about payment of individual
claims).
97. Id. at 419-30.
98. Braucher supra note 3, at 1406 n.3, 1450-60 ("This choice of scope [which
excludes "cases involving personal injury or damage to property"] reflects the view that
class actions do not provide an easy answer.").
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they deserve.99 Attorney's fees and litigation costs may deplete class awards and
settlements, leaving little to compensate individual claimants. 100 Furthermore,
attorneys may shy away from cases involving many claimants with small claims
because the costs of providing notice and administering claims may exhaust any
eventual settlement available to pay the attorneys. 101 Moreover, some class
attorneys increase these risks of depleted class resources by raising their fees
during the litigation process.102
Meanwhile, current informal complaint portals are insufficient purveyors
of consumer justice. For example, consumer complaint websites such as Yelp and
online portals for filing complaints like the CFPB's aim to foster public access to
remedies and provide information about problems with products and services. 103
However, the number of complaint websites and breadth of reviews on any given
site can be overwhelming. Consumers struggle to locate reliable information in this
morass of complaints and reviews.104 The questionable quality and unmanageable
quantity of information online is overwhelming.10 5 This is especially true in light
of the growing prevalence of fake reviews that businesses post under the guise of
customer submissions praising the businesses' products and services.106
Furthermore, review and complaint websites are not real resolution
mechanisms. Rather, they simply allow consumers to vent frustrations. Companies
often do not provide any response to complaints on social media and may ignore e-
mails or send written replies that provide no real assistance-leading consumers to
give up pursuit of their complaints. 107 One study of the Facebook and Twitter
accounts of 34 large U.S. companies found that the companies ignored nearly half
99. George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the
Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 25-27 (2012).
100. Id. at 24-27.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See YELP, http://www.yelp.com/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016); Consumer
Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
104. Adi Ayal & Uri Benoliel, Revitalizing the Case for Good Cause Statutes:
The Role of Review Sites, 19 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 331, 332-47 (2014) (discussing
credibility issues and information overload with review websites).
105. Id. at 346-52 (discussing need for proper sorting, filtering, averaging,
ranking and visual graph systems to address information overload, as well as mechanisms
aimed to prevent fake reviews).
106. Justin Malbon, Taking Fake Online Consumer Reviews Seriously, 35 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 4 (2013) (also noting that consumers are more likely to trust reviews on
established websites like Amazon).
107. Judy Strauss & Donna J. Hill, Consumer Complaints by E-mail: An
Exploratory Investigation of Corporate Responses and Customer Reactions, 15 J.
INTERACTIVE MARKETING 63, 63-64 (2001); Customer Complaint Behaviour, QUEENSLAND
GoV'T, http://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/running/customer-service/managing-
customer-complaints/customer-complaint-behaviour (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
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of the complaints consumers submitted. 10s Furthermore, when companies
responded, they left consumers dissatisfied in roughly 60% of the cases. 109
Even the CFPB's Consumer Complaint Database can be unsatisfying for
consumers seeking real remedies.'10 The CFPB's database covers only consumer
financial products like mortgages, loans, bank accounts or services, credit cards,
and prepaid cards. ' Additionally, the database does not purport to resolve
complaints. 1 12 The CFPB's website states that companies should reply and provide
resolutions with respect to consumer complaints, but the website provides no
legally enforceable mechanism nor does the Bureau actually follow up on
individual complaints.113
The CFPB has worked to improve the functionality of the complaint
portal by including narratives if consumers consent to share their stories.114 After
108. Sabine A. Einwiller & Sarah Steilen, Handling Complaints on Social
Network Sites - An Analysis of Complaints and Complaint Responses on Facebook and
Twitter Pages of Large US Companies, 41 PUB. REL. REV. 195, 197-200 (2015)
(highlighting results of the study).
109. Id. at 198-202 (emphasizing that consumers usually want redress, and more
than an apology or a place to "vent").
110. RICHARD CORDRAY, DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER COMPLAINT NARRATIVE
DATA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, at 2-3 (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-disclosure-of-consumer-complaint-
narrative-data.pdf (explaining the CFPB's policy but not promising any real results after
consumers file complaints).
111. See id.
112. As Richard Cordray notes:
Screened complaints are sent via a secure web portal to the appropriate
company. The company reviews the information, communicates with
the consumer as needed, and determines what action to take in response.
The company then reports to the consumer and the CFPB via the secure
company portal, and the [CFPB] invites the consumer to review the
response and provide feedback. Consumer Response reviews the
feedback consumers provide about company responses, using this
information along with other information such as the timeliness of the
company's response, for example, to help prioritize complaints for
investigation. Consumers who have submitted complaints with the
[CFPB] can log onto the secure consumer portal available on the
CFPB's website or call a toll-free number to receive status updates,
provide additional information, and review responses provided to the
consumer by the company.
RICHARD CORDRAY, CONSUMER RESPONSE TO ANNUAL REPORT JANUARY 1 - DECEMBER 31,




114. The press release states:
Consumer Response screens all complaints submitted by consumers
based on several criteria, including whether the complaint should be
routed to another regulator and whether the complaint is complete.
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scrubbing personally identifiable information, the CFPB publishes the narratives
separately after the company responds, or in the absence of a response, 60 days
after the customer submits the narrative. Nonetheless, adding narratives to the
CFPB's complaints database may further frustrate a consumer searching for
reliable information about financial services. 116 For example, the CFPB complaint
database provides no easy way for consumers to search by company name or find
the frequency of complaints by product listing. 117 Even law professors and news
reporters have had difficulty using the database.11
Real-world consumers need real-world remedies and the current web of
arbitration clauses, class action waivers, and uncertain class action rules have left
consumers without satisfactory processes for obtaining these remedies. Travel, lost
time, and other costs-along with the stresses of in-person interactions and F2F
processes-make litigation or F2F arbitration unappealing for most consumers
with small claims. In addition, commentators have argued for more robust
government action against wrongdoers on behalf of consumers, but it is unclear
how much litigation activity would occur and how related costs would be
covered. 119 Accordingly, consumers need new means to access remedies on small-
dollar claims.
Screened complaints are forwarded via a secure web portal to the
appropriate company. The company then has 15 calendar days to
provide an initial response and up to 60 calendar days to provide a final
response. Companies have the ability within these timeframes to
respond administratively to the [CFPB], e.g., responding that no
commercial relationship exists between the complaining consumer and
the company in question. Typically, the company reviews the
complaint, communicates with the consumer as needed, and determines
what action to take in response. After the company responds to the
consumer and the [CFPB] via the secure company portal, the [CFPB]
invites the consumer to review the response and provide feedback.
Consumer Response investigations staff individually review some
complaints. All complaints are subject to follow-up and further
investigation by Consumer Response and other parts of the [CFPB].
However, there is no assurance that the CFPB will follow-up or investigate. CORDRAY,
supra note 110, at 2-3.
115. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Publishes Over 7,700
Consumer Complaint Narratives About Financial Companies (June 25, 2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-publishes-over-7700-consumer-
complaint-narratives-about-financial-companies.
116. CORDRAY, supra note 110, at 4-5.
117. See E-mail from Alex Gano, Research Assistant, to Amy J. Schmitz,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law (July 7, 2015) (on file with author) (noting
the difficulty of searching the morass of complaints on the CFPB portal).
118. See E-mail from Pamela Foohey, Assoc. Professor of Law, Ind. Univ.
Maurer Sch. of Law, to Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law
(Aug. 3, 2015) (on file with author) (noting her difficulties in gathering information from
the CFPB database, as well as the difficulties a newspaper reporter experienced with the
site).
119. Fitzpatrick, supra note 47, at 197-98.
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Formalistic contract enforcement and reluctance against substantive
consumer protections have contributed to the strict enforcement and consequent
proliferation of arbitration clauses in B2C contracts. These clauses are significant
because they preclude consumers from bringing light to consumer issues by
asserting claims in court. Moreover, a class action waiver generally accompanies
these arbitration clauses, which is often the only economically feasible means for
seeking relief on small-dollar claims.
II. "LIFE" LIMITATIONS AND BUSINESS BEHAVIORS THAT HINDER
CONSUMER ACTION
Substantive consumer protections and disclosure rules, such as those in
Dodd-Frank and other consumer protection laws, assist consumers only to a
limited extent. However, such consumer protection measures are often
meaningless for the majority of consumers who lack awareness, experience, or the
resources necessary to navigate traditional F2F processes for obtaining
remedies. 120 Consumers' inability and inaptitude for pursuing these processes
prevents most from pursuing complaints, thereby allowing businesses to escape
wrongdoing and privately control the resolution of persistent consumers' claims. 121
As discussed elsewhere, behavioral propensities and business predilections
converge to create a SWS that perpetuates contractual discrimination.122
A. Consumers' Predisposition Against Pro-action
Consumers are predisposed to forego their B2C claims. Individuals are
inert by nature, and lack the time and resources to digest long and complex form
contracts. 123 Individuals are also prone toward over-optimism, cognitive
dissonance, and confirmation bias with respect to their purchases. Accordingly,
businesses know that consumers rarely realize their rights because they largely
ignore contract terms, especially in e-contracts that require consumers to click a
120. Schmitz, Squeaky Wheel System, supra note 15, at 279-366.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1204-06, 1222-25, 1243-44 (2003)
(discussing law-and-economics' assumptions regarding consumer rationality); Debra
Pogrund Star & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of
Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 85, 98-99 (2010) (discussing normally overlooked terms,
including adjustable rates versus fixed rates on loan agreements).
124. See Star & Choplin, supra note 123, at 100-01 (discussing "anchoring
effects"); see also Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REv. 117, 122-24 (2007) (explaining behavioral law and economics
basics); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583, 1605-09,
1627 (1998) (noting individuals' "tunnel vision" skewed by their biases). But see Richard
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551,
1559-75 (1998) (criticizing behavioral law and economics as merely a psychological and




link or scroll endlessly through terms.125 This allows businesses to avoid consumer
claims and ration remedies to the few sophisticated consumers with resources and
sufficient savvy to pursue their claims. 126
These tendencies converge to hinder consumers from bringing their
claims to the courts, regulators, or third parties such as a local chamber of
commerce or the Better Business Bureau ("BBB"). 127 Shame, a sense of
insufficient power, fear, gratitude, and frustrated resignation can overshadow costs
in explaining individuals' reluctance to assert complaints. 12 This is especially true
for low- to moderate-income individuals. 129 For example, consumers may forego
complaints against cellular phone companies due to the companies' power to
determine prices and deny complaints.130 Furthermore, women may be reluctant to
assert complaints or pursue their needs due to fear of appearing "pushy." 131
Women also are less likely than men to negotiate or use assertive language when
they do pursue negotiations.132 Similarly, research shows that black consumers are
less likely than white consumers to complain about their purchases.133 This often
results in black consumers receiving fewer deals regardless of education or
-134income.
125. See Korobkin, supra note 123, at 1268-69.
126. Again, full discussion of these behavioral propensities and the SWS is
beyond the scope of this Article, as it has been discussed elsewhere. See Schmitz, Squeaky
Wheel System, supra note 15, at 279-366.
127. Sandefur, supra note 13, at 112-32.
128. Id. at 112.
129. Id. at 117 ("The implication of this body of research is that people whose
social position is near the bottom of an unequal structure will be less likely to take actions
that might protect or further their own interests, whether those actions involve seeking
information or advice, pressing claims with others seen as causing a problem, or attempting
to mobilize third parties in the furtherance of their goals.").
130. See Adi Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone
Market, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 91-100 (2011) (discussing how cell-phone
companies use complexity to take advantage of the consumer); Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca
Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 118 (2009) (noting how power
plays a role in cellular service contracts "designed to exploit the cognitive biases of many
consumers").
131. See Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The
Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 629, 629-30 (1998) (explaining societal expectations that women should be
less confrontational); Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Differences in
Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653, 656 (1999).
132. See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION
AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 20 (2003) (noting gender in contracting); Charles B. Craver &
David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 299, 309-10 (1999) (discussing gender in negotiations).
133. Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress,
11 L. & Soc'Y REV. 701, 707, 723-24 (1977) (reporting study findings).
134. Id. at 707.
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Moreover, the proactive consumers who obtain remedies tend to be of
higher incomes and education.135 For example, one study indicated, "[F]or every
1,000 purchases, households in the highest status category voice complaints
concerning 98.9 purchases, while households in the lowest status category voice
complaints concerning 60.7 purchases." 136 Consumers in lower socioeconomic
status groups generally have fewer resources, expect poor treatment, and are
sometimes hindered by limited English proficiency. 137 They also may lack
confidence in their ability to obtain remedies if problems arise. 138
Moreover, consumers may not take action on their claims because they
simply do not think of them as a legal issue. 139 Instead, they may focus on social
and psychological considerations.140 Consumers are therefore apt to drop purchase
complaints if pursuit requires them to hire an attorney, file a claim in court or with
an arbitrator, or attend F2F meetings. Additionally, overly optimistic consumers do
not want to believe they made bad purchases and confirmation bias may lead them
to ignore problems in hopes of confirming that they made wise decisions. 141
Businesses also may harness captology, or persuasive technology, to further hinder
consumers from asserting complaints. 142
In addition, F2F processes are usually infeasible simply because
individuals lack the time, knowledge, or patience to pursue small-claims court
proceedings.143 For example, the CFPB found in its recent study of cases involving
financial institutions that consumers rarely bring actions against the institutions in
small-claims court.144 Rather, statewide data for 14 jurisdictions and countywide
135. See Bird Tronvoll, Complainer Characteristics When Exit Is Closed, 18
INT'L J. SERV. INDUSTRY MGMT. 25 (2007),
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/09564230710732885 (discussing
research regarding characteristics of consumers who complain about their purchases).
136. Schmitz, Squeaky Wheel System, supra note 15, at 313 (quoting Best &
Andreasen, supra note 133, at 723).
137. Tronvoll, supra note 135, at 25-36; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-10-518, FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL LITERACY OF INDIVIDUALS WITH LIMITED
ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 9-10 (2010) (reporting how limited English proficiency, income, and
education impact financial education, and the ability to take effective actions regarding
contracts and money management).
138. Tronvoll, supra note 135, at 33-34.
139. Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical
Study of Access to Justice, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 101, 117-20 (quoting Rebecca L. Sandefur,
Money Isn't Everything: Understanding Moderate Income Households' Use of Lawyers'
Services, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE 233 (Michael Trebilock et al. eds., 2012)).
140. Id. at 118.
141. See generally Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation,
Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987)
(discussing confirmation bias).
142. See What is Captology?, STAN. PERSUASIVE TECH. LAB,
http://captology.stanford.edu/about/what-is-captology.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
143. See generally Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 139, at 104.
144. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
§ 1028(A), at 307-20 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-arbitration-
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data from 17 urban areas indicated that it was much more likely for the financial
institutions to use small-claims court to pursue collections against the
consumers. 145 In searching the small-claims docket for cases involving the 10
largest credit-card issuers, representing 85% of credit-card contracts, the CFPB
estimated that consumers sued a credit-card issuer only 870 times in 2012, whereas
the credit-card companies brought suit against consumers an estimated 41,303
times. 146
F2F complaint and claims procedures generally cost too much and take
too much time to effectively vindicate small-dollar claims. People busy with work
and family obligations are likely to give up pursuit of complaints when companies
ignore their initial requests for assistance.147 Anger may fuel a consumer's initial
e-mail, phone call, or negative online review, but consumers generally do not
follow up after receiving no reply or facing long hold times on customer service
phone lines. 148 Customer service representatives also may lack authority to provide
remedies or make it stressful for consumers to obtain any redress. 149
B. Business Behaviors Hindering Consumer Action
Businesses consciously or subconsciously capitalize on consumers'
behavioral propensities to deter individuals from pursuing claims and obtaining
remedies. As an initial matter, businesses have been curtailing or eliminating
telephone assistance. Businesses with current telephone assistance numbers
exhaust consumers with long telephone wait times, endless voicemail menus, or
rerouting calls to various departments. 150 Businesses may also staff email reply
centers with individuals who lack training or the authority to provide meaningful
remedies in response to consumers' complaints. 151
Reports of declining customer service are rampant. In a 2001 customer
service study, researchers found that e-mail complaints garnered a response rate of
only 67%, of which only 56% of responses were considered satisfactory. 152
Meanwhile, telephone complaints obtained a 74% response rate, but customers
study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (questioning whether consumers sue companies in small-
claims courts).
145. Id.
146. Id. (also stating that there is "a dearth of empirical data and academic
literature on the topic-or why such studies tend to look at fragmentary data").
147. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 133, at 715 (arguing the likelihood that a
consumer will complain relates to the complexity in the consumer complaint process).
148. See Sheri Carder & Larry Gunter, Can You Hear Me? Corporate America's
Communication with Dissatisfied Customers, 24 J. AM. & COMP. CULTURES 109, 109-10
(2001).
149. See How to Get What You Want from Customer Service, NBC 9NEws (NBC
9News television broadcast July 16, 2014),
http://www.9news.com/story/money/business/2014/07/16/tips-for-getting-what-you-want-
from-customer-service/12765815/ (reporting a consumer's laborious attempt to obtain
assistance from a Comcast customer service representative).
150. See generally Carder & Gunter, supra note 148, at 109-10 (reporting study
results showing businesses' low response rates to consumer complaints).
151. See id. at 109-11 (discussing study).
152. Id.
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considered only 48% of the responses satisfactory.153 Businesses were even less
responsive to written complaints. Letters garnered only a 43% response rate, of
which only 26% were satisfactory. 154 Similarly, another researcher found that only
60 out of 240 upper-class New York restaurants responded to his complaint
letters. 155 This was true "even when [the researcher] threatened [the restaurant]
with a bad report to the Better Business Bureau[,] and even when [the restaurants
were] threatened with a health condition that could completely close their
business." 1 5 6
Businesses also have been slow to respond to negative online reviews and
postings. Businesses should respond effectively to negative electronic word-of-
mouth, or "eWOM," due to its importance in gaining and retaining customer
loyalty.157 However, one study in 2011 revealed a complaint response rate on
Twitter of only 33%. 15 Interestingly, companies are even less responsive to
complaints voiced on their own corporate sites.159 Moreover, "full financial or
material compensation is hardly ever offered by companies" on their social media
sites.160 As one commentator noted:
Here, the evidence is scathing. Andreasen (1988) reported that
one third of complaints ended with an unsatisfactory resolution.
We have not gotten any better over the last thirty years. Kelly,
Hoffman and Davis (1993) reported that over one third of retail
recovery strategies were unacceptable to customers. Oliver
(1997) found it reasonable to conclude that 50% (plus or minus
15%) of all complainers will remain dissatisfied even after receipt
of redress from the firm. Broetzmann (2013) found that 56% of
complainers felt that the organization did nothing to handle their
complaint, up from 50% in 2003.161
There is a need for more research on what consumers expect to obtain
from posting negative reviews online. Similarly, additional research is needed to
explain why businesses only occasionally respond. It may be that customers expect
no response and simply seek the satisfaction of airing their grievances.162
153. Id.
154. Id. at 110-11. Furthermore, the response time for letters averaged 20.5 days.
Id.
155. Id. at 109.
156. Id. (leading one commentator to describe this nonresponse strategy as
"ignore [complaints] and hope the angry customers go away").
157. Einwiller & Steilen, supra note 108.
158. Id. at 196-98.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 199-202.
161. Moshe Davidow, The A-Craft Model of Organizational Responses to
Customer Complaints and Their Impact on Post-complaint Customer Behavior, 27 J.
CONSUMER SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION & COMPLAINING BEHAV. 70, 71 (2014).
162. John W. Huppertz, The Effort Model of Consumer Complaining Behavior:
An Update and New Research Directions, 27 J. CONSUMER SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION
& COMPLAINING BEHAV. 2, 2-5 (2014).
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Nonetheless, consumers must be careful in posting negative reviews.
Businesses have become bolder in filing or threatening lawsuits against those who
post negative reviews online. In the past five years, merchants have frequently
sued customers who post negative reviews on sites such as Angie's List, Amazon,
and Yelp. For example, a hotel and wedding venue in New York maintained a
contract policy that allowed the venue to deduct $500 from a customer's deposit
"for every negative review of [the venue] placed on any Internet site by anyone in
[the customer's] party and/or attending [his] wedding or event." 16 3 Although the
hotel never actually filed a lawsuit, the clause went viral after a wedding guest
posted a negative review and the hotel threatened to charge the wedding party. 164
Similarly, an internet provider sued one of its customers for posting
negative reviews on several review sites regarding the speed and price of its
service. 165 Although the provider later dropped the claim, the suit caused the
customer to suffer considerable costs and angst. 166 In another case, a car repair
shop sued a woman in Arizona for posting and refusing to delete a negative review
163. Amy Langfield, Hotel Apologizes After 3,000 Bad Reviews, CNBC (Aug. 5,
2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101895483.
164. Id.
165. As Tim Cushing notes:
Beware: This company advertises fast internet speeds, but in reality
rarely provides those speeds.... I order the 20Mbps plan. I ran speed
tests and monitored the line for a full week after install, and these were
the results: Speeds to Peak Internet hosted servers: 90% to 100% of
capacity. This is useful in determining that there is not an issue between
the transmitter on my house and the tower. Speeds to any other speed
test server, CDN, website, regular download server: 50% or less of
capacity. I tested to multiple types of servers at multiple locations
across the USA. My average speed was 7Mbps. My max speed was
12Mbps. I never once went above 12. When I contacted Peak Internet
about this issue and provided them the documentation of the tests I had
been running they refused to acknowledge the issue. They said I was
getting above their guaranteed minimum (4Mbps) and that I should
actually be happy that I was getting 12Mbps.... They didn't have any
desire to provide good service. They just wanted to make their money
and not deal with people who call them out on their false advertising. I
feel sorry for somebody less technologically savvy that is paying for
their higher packages but getting slow speeds....
Tim Cushing, ISP Sues Former Customer Over Reviews Claiming His Internet Speed Was
Less Than A Third of What Was Advertised, TECHDIRT (July 30, 2014),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140730/05412628052/isp-sues-former-customer-over-
reviews-claiming-his-internet-speed-was-less-than-third-what-was-advertised.shtml.
166. Complaint at 11 5-21, Fundamental Holdings, Corp. v. Petrick, (2014),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1237569/complaint-teller-county.txt; Tim
Cushing, Peak Internet Dismisses Defamation Suit Against Former Customer Who
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of her service experience. 167 Additionally, a Virginia court ordered a woman to
pay $750,000 for posting negative reviews about a contractor who performed work
on her home. 16 8 The contractor ultimately collected nothing after a court found that
both parties had defamed each other. The case, however, exemplifies the new class
of lawsuits against those who post negative reviews online. 169
Businesses have also sued review websites like Yelp directly. For
instance, in 2014, a carpet cleaning company doubted the authenticity of reviews
posted on Yelp and filed a lawsuit against it. 170 The company issued a subpoena
duces tecum to Yelp to produce documents with information about the authors of
the online reviews at issue. 171 After a series of motions and appeals, the circuit
court ordered Yelp to produce the documents, and the appeals court found that the
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that the statements, if false, may be
defamatory in nature.172 Nonetheless, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed and
held that the court lacked power to order Yelp to produce documents identifying
the reviewers. 173
167. Dave Cherry, Company Sues AZ Woman Over Negative Online Review, CBS
(Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.cbs5az.com/story/21201698/company-sues-az-woman-over-
negative-online-review. The woman posted a review stating that the repair shop did a poor
job and refused her phone calls after performing service. The company sued the reviewer
for allegedly posting a review that was not truthful, which the reviewer refused to delete.
Copies of court records in this matter were not publically available at the time of this draft.
See also Josh Smith, Woman Sued Over Online Review: 3 Tips to Avoid a Lawsuit, DAILY
FIN. (June 30, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/06/30/woman-sued-over-online-
review-3-tips-to-avoid-a-lawsuit; Woman Sued For Slamming Company on Angie's List,
CBS NEWS (June 29, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/woman-sued-for-slamming-
company-on-angies-list/ (discussing another similar lawsuit).
168. Perez v. Dietz Dev., LLC, No. 122157, 2012 WL 6761997 (Va. Dec. 28,
2012); Justin Jouvenal, Fairfax Jury Declares a Draw in Closely Watched Case Over 'Yelp'
Reviews, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/locallin-closely-
watched-yelp-case-jury-finds-dual-victory/2014/01/31/2dl74580-8ae5-1 1e3-a5bd-
844629433ba3_story.html.
169. See Adam Cohen, Online Reviewers Beware: You Can Get Sued, TIME (Jan.
7, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/201 3/01/07/yelp-reviewers-beware-you-can-get-sued/.
170. Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Va. Ct.
App. 2014).
171. Id. at 557-58.
172. Id. at 556-57.
173. The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately reversed the subpoena order, stating:
[Virginia law did not empower] the circuit court ... to enforce the non-
party subpoena duces tecum directing Yelp to produce documents
located in California in connection with Hadeed's underlying
defamation action against the John Doe defendants in the Virginia
circuit court. The information sought by Hadeed is stored by Yelp in the
usual course of its business on administrative databases within the
custody or control of only specified Yelp employees located in San
Francisco, and thus, beyond the reach of the circuit court.
Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440, 445-47 (Va. 2015).
236
2016] BUSINESS-TO-CONSUMER 237
To be fair, businesses have a right to bring lawsuits against customers
who harm the business's reputation by posting improper or unfounded
complaints. 174 This was arguably the scenario behind a dog trainer's lawsuit
against a former customer, who voiced her complaints against the trainer on Yelp
and Angie's List. 175 The customer posted complaints stating that she enrolled her
puppy in an obedience class at the dog trainer's school, hoping that the dog would
be trained as a therapy dog for sick children and the elderly. 176 She further said
that the trainer kept the puppy in an area away from other animals. 177 The dog
trainer responded to the customer's review by offering several solutions, including
private sessions, and then refunded the defendant's payment for the classes. 178
However, the customer continued to post negative reviews even after the dog
trainer sent a demand letter asking the customer to delete her false statements. 179
The trainer finally sued seeking damages for defamation and breach of contract. so
Most businesses are not so proactive and may ignore consumer
complaints, believing that they save money by curtailing customer service and
ignoring complaining customers. 8 However, one study suggests that it is roughly
five times harder to attract new customers than to retain current ones. This
translates into 25-85% higher profits by merely retaining an additional 5% of
current customers.182 Furthermore, satisfied complainers become especially loyal
customers, 183 while dissatisfied complainers are prone to share their negative
experiences on social media and review sites.184 Because the success of a company
174. See generally Libel, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
175. Complaint, Dog Tranquility, LLC v. Ujimori, No. 2015-002851 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 3, 2015).
176. See Erik Sherman, Dog Trainer Says 'Bad Customer,' Sues for $65K Over
Reviews, DAILY FIN. (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2015/03/27/dog-trainer-
says-bad-customer-sues-for-65k-over-reviews/; see also Mark Hansen, Negative Reviews of
Dog Obedience School on Yelp, Angie's List Lead to Defamation Lawsuit, AM. BAR Ass'N
J., (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/negativejreviewslead-to-lawsuit.
177. Id.
178. Complaint at 11 35-40, Dog Tranquility, LLC v. Ujimori, No. 2015-002851
(Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2015) (restating the long and somewhat confusing complaint posting);
Id. at ¶ 25 (noting remedies provided).
179. Id. at ¶42-75.
180. Id. at¶¶50-75.
181. The Problem With Customer Service, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 2015, at 10-11.
182. WOLF J. RINKE, DON'T OIL THE SQUEAKY WHEEL: AND 19 OTHER
CONTRARIAN WAYS TO IMPROVE YOUR LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS 133-38 (2004).
183. See Tibbett L. Speer, They Complain Because They Care, 18 AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS 13 (1996) (noting "grousers are likely to remain loyal" if they are happy
with the resolution of their complaints); Lenden Webb, Brainstorming Meets Online
Dispute Resolution, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 337, 357-58 (2004) (citing studies).
184. See generally PETE BLACKSHAW, SATISFIED CUSTOMERS TELL THREE
FRIENDS, ANGRY CUSTOMERS TELL 3,000: RUNNING A BUSINESS IN TODAY'S CONSUMER-
DRIVEN WORLD 4-6 (2008) (noting how an upset consumer spread his complaint to at least
62,827 others online); New Ways to Complain, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG,
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/consumer-protection/new-ways-to-
complain/overview/index.htm (last updated Aug. 2011).
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largely depends on its reputation, negative social media campaigns can provide a
dangerous liability for corporations and a successful alternative to litigation for
consumers. However, the overall lack of pressure on businesses from consumers
and businesses' focus on cost-savings may explain why businesses generally
ignore the majority of customer complaints.
C. Market Failures and Information Frailties
As noted above, online complaint websites and regulatory actions should
help spread information about purchase problems, and thus assist market
regulation. 18 6 However, budget limitations have hindered regulators' capacity to
bring enforcement actions. Furthermore, the largely unregulated and unwieldy
morass of online complaint portals has created "noise" that drowns out any
"informed minority." Market theorists propose that an informed minority of
individuals could inform the masses about purchase problems, which would in turn
prompt consumers to pressure businesses to improve their practices or face
lawsuits, negative publicity, and lost customers. 187 The problem is that it is tough
to have an informed minority when consumers cannot identify who and what to
believe online due to the maze of not only more mainstream review sites, such as
Yelp, but also individualized gripe sites, such as homedepotsucks.com and u-
hell. 18
Meanwhile, studies continue to cast doubt on the existence of a true
informed minority. Researchers who studied consumers' internet-browsing
behavior on 66 online software companies' websites found that only 1 or 2 out of
1,000 shoppers on these sites even accessed the companies' standard form
contracts.189 Furthermore, the shoppers rarely investigated products, or terms and
185. Tristan Morales, Social Media Campaigns as an Emerging Alternative to
Litigation, 38 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 35, 50-71 (2012) (noting the example of
how an individual consumer blogged about his dissatisfaction with his Dell computer and
Dell customer service, sparking articles from New York Times and Businessweek).
186. See Shmuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism:
Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 747, 750-55, 800-04 (2009) (proposing reforms); Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1474-80, 1546-47
(1998) (also indicating hope that economists and lawyers would incorporate empirical
findings into their assumptions); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law:
The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1263, 1325-26
(1993) (calling courts to consider what the consumer actually knew or should have known
in assessing enforcement of form contracts); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1230-43 (1983) (discussing enforcement
of adhesion contracts).
187. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 635-39
(1979) (discussing this theory); see R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's
Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 646 (1996).
188. See Morales, supra note 185, at 65-71.
189. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer
Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-17, 33-37 (2014).
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conditions of their purchases.190 Moreover, consumers are especially unlikely to
investigate remedy terms related to smaller purchases. 191 It is therefore
unsurprising that they also forego bringing claims.192 For example, one European
study found that only 7% of consumer cases ended with a resolution in court or an
alternative proceeding, 193 while 45% of launched complaints ended without
resolution. 194
As noted above, such foregone consumer complaints generally leave
companies free to ration remedies by assisting only the best-informed and most
persistent consumers who artfully submit complaints. 195 These consumers then
have little to no incentive to expend additional time and resources to alert the
majority about available remedies. Moreover, consumers are especially prone to
keep quiet about the remedies they obtain when they know companies will cut
back assistance to persistent individuals like them if the companies have to provide
the same assistance for everyone else. 196
Merchants also may escape the responsibility to provide consumers with
quality products by severely limiting warranties or making them practically
useless. For example, a manufacturer's warranty for a roughly $12.50 curling iron
states a "Limited 24-Month Warranty" covers "defects in material or
workmanship."197 However, the warranty limits the consumer's remedy after 30
days to a "replacement" process that requires the purchaser to send back the
defective curling iron, postage prepaid, along with an additional $6, and proof of
purchase. 198 This means that the consumer would essentially have to pay for two
curling irons to enjoy one working iron-making the remedy uneconomical.
However, the manufacturer may at least cover the $6 to send a replacement
product to the rare squeaky wheel consumer who is persistent in seeking a
remedy. 199
190. Id. at 34.
191. Royce De R. Barondes, Frictions and the Persistence of Inferior Contract
Terms, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 257, 259-77 (2015).
192. See Marco B.M. Loos, Individual Private Enforcement of Consumer Rights
in Civil Courts in Europe 5-14 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Contract Law, Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 2010/01, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535819 (discussing the need for
reform to increase consumers' private enforcement of European contract regulations).
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id. This suggested that consumers who took initial action on their complaints
gave up their pursuit along the way, and that even initially proactive consumers are unlikely
to continue a fight to the benefit of themselves, let alone all consumers. Id. at 3-4.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
196. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 17, at 890.
197. Product Papers for Rose Gold Curling Irons, Revlon (purchased in June
2015) (on file with author).
198. Id.
199. E-mails between retailconsumer-services@hotus.com, Customer Serv. for
Revlon, and Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law (June 22-24,
2015) (on file with author). This Author tested the SWS by sending multiple e-mails to ask
how the warranty would work and to request that the company pay all shipping. Eventually,
the customer service representative said they would cover the cost to send the new product,
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These business practices may allow discriminatory treatment. Differential
pricing is not new, but a recent government report highlighted how it has become
even more common with the growth of Big Data.200 Businesses now gather large
volumes of data regarding consumers and their behavior and use it to make
201predictions about individual customers. Smartphones and other technological
platforms have allowed businesses to collect not only basic income, debt, and
demographic information, but also individuals' locations, search histories,
browsing habits, "likes," songs and videos, retail purchase histories, online
reviews, and blog posts. 202 This allows businesses to gather and aggregate
203information for targeted advertising, steering, and personalized pricing.
This fuels efficient marketing for businesses, and benefits consumers who
are happy to trade their privacy for what they see as good deals. Indeed, the most
highly valued consumers may happily reap the best deals and assistance. However,
204they may not fully comprehend their loss of privacy. Additionally, this use of
data analytics leads to lesser deals and product degradation such as versioning for
205those who already have lower income and status. Furthermore, businesses often
implement versioning and price differentials through opaque terms that
206disproportionately harm unsophisticated buyers. I have therefore questioned
how such data practices have augmented the divide between consumer "haves"
and "have-nots." 2 0 7
Furthermore, conscious or subconscious biases in F2F dealings may lead
company representatives to offer the least advantageous prices to racial
minorities.208 For example, in December 2013, the CFPB and the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") found that more than 12,000 car dealerships that participated in
Ally Financial's indirect financing program charged higher interest rates to
approximately 235,000 African-American, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander
but this Author would still be responsible for costs to ship the curling iron from Colorado to
Texas.
200. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERs, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL
PRICING 3-5 (2015) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE, BIG DATA REPORT],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse-files/docs/BigDataReportNo
nembargo-v2.pdf (accompanying progress report on the overall big data effort launched by
President Obama in 2014).
201. Id. at 3; see also Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores, supra note 17, at 1411-
33 (exploring how data brokers have used gathered information to provide consumers with
different deals and remedies).
202. See WHITE HOUSE, BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 200, at 4-9.
203. Id. at 9-13.
204. Id. at 13-19.
205. Id. at 4-6.
206. Id. at 6.
207. See Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores, supra note 17, at 1411-33 (noting
how Big Data has been used to foster discrimination that defies easy detection).
208. See Jan Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REv. 817, 819-43 (1991) (discussing theories of discrimination
and providing further detail regarding his study of Chicago car sales; also finding that black
consumers had to pay over twice the markup paid by all other customers, regardless of
market competition that should have eliminated such discrimination).
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borrowers than they charged to non-Hispanic white borrowers with similar
financial profiles. 209 Customer service associates' conscious and subconscious
biases also may affect how they treat women and other identifiable groups.2 1 0 In
addition, consumers may perpetuate their own low-power status by assuming that
customer service representatives will unfairly brush them aside.2 1 1
Consumers' and companies' behaviors and predilections combine to
hinder consumers from obtaining remedies on their B2C claims, thereby impeding
market fairness regulation and allowing arguable contractual discrimination to
persist. Individuals are typically inert, and lack the legal understanding and
resources to pursue their claims. The costs of pursuing claims also impede
212
consumers in obtaining remedies. Furthermore, businesses have curbed
customer service and may ration remedies to the most persistent, sophisticated, and
213highly valued customers. This combines with data analytics to result in
consumers receiving different deals and assistance based on status, income, and
other improper data points.214 Accordingly, more accessible and low-cost remedy
processes are essential to assist consumers in obtaining real remedies on typical
B2C claims.
III. SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS AIMED TO MAKE REMEDIES REAL
Professor Braucher highlighted "law in action" and the need for
215
substantive reforms to make consumer protections real for common consumers.
Professor Braucher noted the CFPB's attention to the substance of consumer
contracts and she considered how businesses exploited consumers with abusive
practices and bad crediting tactics. 216 She therefore suggested that tort- and
contract-based solutions are insufficient to combat lenders' "sweatbox model" that
profits from luring customers with low initial rates and then "cranking up the heat
on 'sweaters' by charging late payment fees and penalty rates, reaping profits
before they eventually default." 2 1 7 Building on Professor Braucher's call for real
solutions, this Article suggests substantive changes in consumer dispute resolution
processes through development of ODR. These ODR processes will address a
different sort of "sweatbox"-a model that businesses will use to push consumers
209. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB and DOJ Order Ally
to Pay $80 Million to Consumers Harmed by Discriminatory Auto Loan Pricing (Dec. 20,
2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-ally-to-pay-80-
million-to-consumers-harmed-by-discriminatory-auto-loan-pricing (discussing action
against Ally related to this discrimination against loan applicants in credit transactions on
the basis of characteristics such as race and national origin).
210. See also LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY 7-8
(2007) (noting works in this area by Professor Blake Morant).
211. Cf Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L.
REv. 103, 107-12 (2000) (discussing how minority employees may refrain from
complaining due to stereotype concerns).
212. Schmitz, Squeaky Wheel System, supra note 15.
213. Id. at 281.
214. Id. at 315.
215. See Braucher, supra note 1, at 109-15.
216. Id. at 109.
217. Id. at 120-21.
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to drop complaints instead of "sweating it out" to obtain remedies regarding their
claims. This Article also builds on Professor Braucher's depiction of the "cowboy
contract" in proposing ideas for ODR fairness standards aimed to inspire the same
218
sort of trust and sense of responsibility as the handshake of yore.
A. ODR Attributes
Various substantive reforms may assist consumers in obtaining remedies
on their small-dollar B2C purchases. Some ideas include increased penalty
damages and collection of attorney's fees, as well as rules that make harmful
business practices unlawful. However, this Article focuses on need for cheap,
convenient, and efficient processes for actually obtaining relief on small-dollar
B2C claims. Specifically, it focuses on the development of ODR processes
because they use technology to provide an accessible and low-cost complaint
mechanism, and on review websites that provide real remedies.
ODR processes go beyond merely providing portals for consumers to post
complaints. They use online processes to end disputes without need for the travel,
stress, inconveniences, and other costs of traditional F2F or telephonic dispute
resolution measures. 2 19 ODR systems may utilize automated negotiation processes,
as well as online mediation and arbitration, aimed to end disputes and resolve
complaints.220 These systems are generally user-friendly because they allow
consumers to quickly fill out standard forms and upload related documents to
obtain timely resolutions. They also may use real-time and asynchronous
221
communications for maximum convenience and efficiency.21
ODR systems are distinct from the traditional F2F processes for asserting
consumer disputes in the United States in that they are not necessarily legal in
nature. The American system for resolving disputes is largely legal, even for
222
consumer complaints. As one scholar notes, "If Americans do not go to law,
they face relatively few alternative means of remedy, and the availability of any
,,223
alternatives depends largely upon where they live. However, most consumers
do not perceive purchase problems as legal matters. Rather, consumers simply
218. Jean Braucher, Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme Court's Grand
Tradition of Transactional Fairness, 50 ARIz. L. REv. 191, 192-98 (2008) (explaining how
relational sanctions provided sufficient leverage to get ranchers in the first half of the
twentieth century to comply with their agreements without need for formalities or
litigation).
219. AM. BAR Ass'N, TASK FORCE ON ELEc. COMMERCE & ALT. DISPUTE





221. See, e.g., How It Works, MODRIA, http://modria.com/how-it-works/ (last
visited Dec. 27, 2015).
222. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal
and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 949, 950-54 (2009).




want easy access to assistance without needing to consult lawyers or courts.
ODR would therefore provide this sort of remedy process.
Much of ODR's popularity in Europe and elsewhere stems from its speed
and low cost.225 These systems are more convenient and cost-efficient than F2F
dispute resolution processes because they eliminate travel costs and diminish the
226
need for legal assistance. Furthermore, ODR is expanding globally and gaining
international acceptance due to its ability to transcend borders and escape the legal
constraints of other processes for the resolution of international disputes.2 2 7
At the same time, as noted above, companies are shrinking or eliminating
telephone or F2F customer service, while increasingly suggesting that consumers
228
should reach them online by e-mail or live chat to obtain redress. Consumers
also are moving their complaints online to social media, as well as review and
complaint portals, as mentioned above.229 Again, however, it has become nearly
impossible to navigate the largely unmonitored review and complaint websites,
and even government complaint portals do not promise any resolution of consumer
230disputes. ODR would thus build on the ease of online access to include an end
game for consumers who do not receive adequate assistance through these less
formal processes.
Asynchronous communications and translation programs also give ODR
the advantage of allowing for multilingual processes involving parties from other
countries and cultures.231 Added due process guidelines also could enhance the
fairness of these processes by imposing accreditation rules for systems designers
224. See Braucher, supra note 3, at 1406, 1449-50.
225. See Philippe Gilli6ron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope
or True Fallacy?, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 301, 308-15 (2008) (noting use for
consumer small claims).
226. See id.; see also Public Roundtable on Dispute Resolution for Online
Business-to-Consumer Contracts, 66 Fed. Reg. 7491-03 (Jan. 23, 2001); Public Workshop:
Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Transactions in the Borderless Online
Marketplace, 65 Fed. Reg. 7831-01 (Feb. 16, 2000).
227. See, e.g., More More More: CPR Meeting Highlights, 27 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 125, 127-28 (2009) (highlighting technology and ODR as key elements
in the future of dispute resolution).
228. As noted, many companies are more responsive to complaints posted on
social media and requests sent through e-mails or website chat systems than they are to
phone calls or letters. See Strauss & Hill, supra note 107, at 63-64; QUEENSLAND Gov'T,
supra note 107.
229. See Einwiller & Steilen, supra note 108, at 195-98 (noting the trend toward
posting complaints online, including "any positive or negative statement made by customers
and other stakeholders about the organization, or one of its products or services via the
internet").
230. See supra Section I.B. (discussing complaint sites and portals).
231. Melissa Conley Tyler, 115 and Counting: The State of ODR 2004,
MEDIATE.COM 9, www.mediate.com/odrresources/docs/ODR%202004.doc (last visited Jan.
15, 2016) (noting that as early as 2004, 11% of ODR providers had multilingual
capabilities).
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and the neutrals who may facilitate online mediations and arbitrations. 232
Furthermore, companies that provide for such user-friendly ODR could post a
"trust mark" on their websites. For example, the BBB provides an online
complaint resolution mechanism that has gained credibility from consumers,
industry, and government in part due to its connection with the BBB's
recognizable "trust mark" or seal.233
Online case management also benefits businesses by enabling them to
prioritize cases and respond en masse to certain issues, thereby significantly
improving communication efficiencies. It also helps businesses avoid costly
consumer class claims and government enforcement actions. By addressing
consumer complaints quickly, businesses also may hinder consumers from
spreading negative publicity on social media. At the same time, ODR allows
businesses to efficiently gather information to improve their products and
service-thus enhancing customer loyalty and gaining new customers along the
way.
234That said, online communications do come with dangers. Some
commentators warn that the anonymity of computer-mediation communication
allows for "cyber bullying" and use of abusive or combative language one would
235
not feel comfortable using in person or on the phone. CMC also may diminish
236
empathy and create misinterpretations in online negotiations. However,
individuals have become increasingly adept at expressing themselves through
237
standardized textual cues and emotive characters. CMC has become less sterile
as individuals have developed means for virtually building rapport over the
Internet.238
Furthermore, the relative anonymity and comfort of communicating
through a computer or smartphone may ease some of the social and power
232. Amy J. Schmitz, Building Bridges to Remedies for Consumers in
International eConflicts, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 779, 779-95 (2012) [hereinafter
Schmitz, Building Bridges]; Amy J. Schmitz, "Drive-Thru" Arbitration in the Digital Age:
Empowering Consumers Through Regulated ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REv. 178, 178-244 (2010)
[hereinafter Schmitz, Drive-Thru].
233. Stephen J. Cole & Charles I. Underhill, Fifteen Years of ODR Experience:
The BBB Online Reliability Trust Mark Program, 43 UCC L.J. 443, 446-57 (2010).
234. JARON LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 60-63 (2010)
(noting the anti-human approach fostered by the expansion of internet life).
235. Jan Hoffman, Poisoned Web: Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2010, at Al ('It's easier to fight online, because you feel more brave and
in control."').
236. Id. (discussing dehumanizing impacts of the Internet). For example, "LOL"
can be interpreted as "lots of love" or "lots of laughs," which could make for awkward
interactions if used in reply to news that a friend's loved one passed away.
237. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Taking the Lawyer's
Craft into Virtual Space: Computer-Mediated Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiating,
10 CLINICAL L. REv. 115, 118-26 (2003) (detailing the trends of increased use of CMC).
238. David Allen Larson & Paula Gajewski Mickelson, Technology Mediated
Dispute Resolution and the Deaf Community, 3 HEALTH L. & PoL'Y BRIEF 15, 18 (2009),
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=hlp
(noting benefits and drawbacks of CMC).
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pressures of F2F communications.239 This is especially true for consumers who
fear stereotypes or biases.24 0 For example, a woman with a strong Hispanic accent
may worry that customer service representatives will not understand her and
ignore her complaints over the telephone. In addition, some individuals are less
adversarial online than in-person when the asynchronous nature gives them time to
digest thoughts and dissipate anger before replying.24 1 Individuals also may be
more cautious in composing e-mails due to awareness that their messages are
easily retrievable.242
In sum, most consumers know that the Internet can be effective for
researching purchases and sharing information about products and services. 243
Ideally, however, these sites also would link consumers with means for obtaining
remedies through formalized ODR, such as online mediation, arbitration, and
negotiation.244 There also should be a central ODR portal with companies' ODR
policies, which could link to a nonprofit institution like the BBB or to a regulator
245like the CFPB. Full exploration of precisely how the ODR systems would work
and its applicable guidelines are beyond the scope of this Article.2 4 6 However,
these are initial ideas to advance the possibilities for expanding consumer justice
through ODR.
B. ODR Examples
ODR systems already exist, and their use is growing as companies,
consumers, and policymakers embrace their efficiencies and other attributes. For
239. See Paul Stylianou, Note, Online Dispute Resolution: The Case for a Treaty
Between the United States and the European Union in Resolving Cross-Border E-commerce
Disputes, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 117, 125 (2008) (recognizing emotion involved
with F2F communications).
240. See id. at 125-26 (noting benefits and drawbacks of online dispute resolution
processes).
241. See Susan C. Herring, Computer-Mediated Communication on the Internet,
36 ANN. REV. INFO. Sci. & TECH. 109, 144-45 (2002).
242. See id.; David Allen Larson & Paula Gajewski Mickelson, Technology
Mediated Dispute Resolution Can Improve the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf Ethical
Practices System: The Deaf Community Is Well Prepared and Can Lead by Example, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 131, 140-41 (2008) (explaining evidence that less bullying
occurs through online communication than F2F).
243. For example, Utility Consumers' Action Network ("UCAN") provides an
online forum for consumers to alert others regarding contract dangers and to offer
suggestions for avoiding or responding to consumer issues. See UTILITY CONSUMERS'
ACTION NETWORK, http://www.ucan.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
244. Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Elec. Commerce & Alt. Dispute Resolution,
Addressing Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and Report, 58 Bus.
LAW. 415, 419 (2002) (defining ODR broadly).
245. The federal government established the CFPB to regulate consumer financial
products. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 1031, 12
U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
246. For further discussion of ODR ideas, see, for example Schmitz, Building
Bridges, supra note 232, at 779-95; Schmitz, Drive-Thru, supra note 232, at 178-244; Amy
J. Schmitz, Introducing the "New Handshake" to Expand Remedies and Revive
Responsibility in eCommerce, 26 SAINT THOMAS L. REV. 522, 522-50 (2014).
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example, the retail website eBay has been at the forefront in providing ODR free
247
of charge for its consumers. The eBay "Money Back Guarantee" which applies
when a buyer does not receive an item or the item is not as promised, gives the
buyer the right to file an online complaint within 30 days after the latest estimated
delivery date. 248 The seller then has three business days to respond in the
"Resolution Center."24 9 If the seller does not respond or provide an adequate
remedy, the buyer may ask eBay to assign an ODR neutral to consider the facts
250
and make a determination. If necessary, eBay may enforce ODR determinations
251
via PayPal, eBay's payment system provider, by setting aside a seller's funds.
EBay also provides an "Unpaid Item Policy," which allows sellers to
submit claims through the online Resolution Center against buyers who do not pay
252
for purchased items within two days. If a buyer fails to provide proof of
payment or a valid reason for not paying, eBay may grant the seller a final value
253fee credit and refund the fee for the relisting of the item.
Similarly, eBay provides a "Verified Rights Owner Program" ("VeRO")
that allows intellectual property rights holders to submit a "Notice of Claimed
254Infringement" online with respect to items sold on eBay. Such Notice prompts
eBay to remove an item listing that arguably infringes intellectual property
255
rights. The seller then may file a counter notice to have the item reinstated in ten
days unless the holder of the intellectual property rights informs eBay that it is
seeking a court order to restrain the relisting of the item in accordance with the
256Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
At the same time, eBay recognizes the importance of reviews posted on
its site for sellers' businesses. Accordingly, under eBay's "Independent Feedback
Review" policy, a seller may challenge a review posting within 30 days after its
posting. 257 EBay will then have an impartial third-party reviewer from a
247. Colin Rule, Making Peace on eBay: Resolving Disputes in the World's
Largest Marketplace, ACRESOLUTION: Q. MAG. OF Ass'N FOR CONFLICT RESOL., Fall 2008,
at 8-11, http://colinrule.com/writing/acr2008.pdf.
248. eBay Money Back Guarantee, EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/money-back-guarantee.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (giving both parties 30 days to appeal any determinations).
252. Unpaid Item Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-
item.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
253. Valid reasons for not paying include improper price changes or shipping
costs, seller suspensions, or account hacking. Id. (noting that accumulated unpaid items on
the buyer's account may result in a loss of buying privileges, although either party may
appeal any determinations).
254. How eBay Protects Intellectual Property (VeRO), EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/programs-vero-ov.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2016)
(noting how the right for an eBay member to file a counter notice to reinstate a listing after
a notice of claims infringement is rooted in the DMCA).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Resolving Feedback Problems, EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/feedback-disputes.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
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professional dispute resolution service examine the challenged posting and
determine whether to affirm, withdraw, or take no action regarding the review. 2 58
Additionally, under eBay's "Vehicle Purchase Protection" program, eBay offers
up to $50,000 to cover payment for a vehicle that is not as promised or received by
the customer.259
Despite these ODR programs, however, eBay also has a binding
arbitration clause in its user agreement.2 6 0 Consequently, if parties cannot resolve
261their disputes online, their only recourse is to initiate binding F2F arbitration.
The only way for an eBay user to avoid this arbitration policy and retain the right
to judicial action is for the user to file an opt-out form with eBay within 30 days
262
after the date of accepting eBay's user agreement. Arbitration therefore is the
default for practical purposes, considering that next to no consumers will be
sufficiently proactive to file the opt-out form in that time frame.
PayPal has a nearly identical arbitration policy. However, it also offers
free ODR programs similar to eBay's, which generally make arbitration
unnecessary. For example, PayPal offers ODR for claims related to items not
263
received and for items significantly not as described. The PayPal policy allows
parties to first attempt to settle their disputes through PayPal's online "Resolution
Center," and then to escalate unresolvable disputes for determination by a third-
264party neutral. The ODR neutral will then determine refund eligibility and
265
administer any necessary consequences to the losing party.
Additionally, PayPal protects sellers from claims, chargebacks, or
266
reversals based on unauthorized transactions or items not received. Under this
policy, sellers may submit a notification to PayPal regarding the unauthorized
267transactions or other errors. PayPal will then investigate and issue a
determination. Depending on its findings, PayPal may credit the seller's account
for the suspected error.268 Nonetheless, any resolution sought through PayPal
precludes a purchaser's ability to contact a credit card company for chargeback
258. Independent Feedback Review, EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/feedback-review.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
259. If the buyer cannot resolve the issue with the seller, the buyer must request
reimbursement no later than 45 days after the listing end date. An independent service
provider (the "VPP Administrator") unaffiliated with eBay administers this program.
Vehicle Purchase Protection, EBAY, http://pages.motors.ebay.com/buy/purchase-protection/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
260. eBay User Agreement, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html?rt=nc#17 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
261. The arbitration will begin after a dispute remains unresolved after 30 days of
the Notice of Claim under eBay's User Agreement. Id.
262. Id.
263. PayPal User Agreement, PAYPAL, § 14,
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rights. 2 6 9 This essentially precludes a buyer from "double-dipping" and obtaining
the same remedy twice.
PayPal's and eB ay's ODR programs have garnered customer support
because these programs allow customers to efficiently obtain remedies without the
costs and hassles of traditional claims processes. Nonetheless, other websites also
have ODR policies for limited types of claims, but they often go unused due to
their limitations and ambiguous terms. For example, Facebook's terms of service
seem to indicate that users' only alternative is to submit all claims to litigation in
California courts.270 However, a closer reading of the terms reveals that Facebook
does offer an ODR mechanism through TRUSTe, an internet privacy management
service, for resolution of certain privacy disputes.2 7 1
Through TRUSTe's ODR program, Facebook customers can submit
privacy-specific complaints, subject to important exceptions for any complaint that
"seeks only monetary damages," "alleges fraud or other violations of statutory or
regulatory law," or "has been resolved under a previous court action, arbitration, or
other form of dispute resolution." 2 7 2 Any determinations on the privacy claims
through this ODR program do not bar an individual's right to seek other legal
273
action. However, parties must comply with TRUSTe's determination or face




270. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last
visited July 15, 2015) (ostensibly stating that consumers will resolve their disputes through
litigation in California). Notably, Facebook dropped its binding arbitration program in 2009.
Greg Beck, Facebook Dumps Binding Arbitration, CONSUMER L. & PoL'Y BLOG (Feb. 26,
2009), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2009/02/facebook-dumps-binding-mandatory-
arbitration.html.
271. Dispute Resolution FAQ's, TRUSTE, https://www.truste.com/consumer-
resources/dispute-resolution/dispute-resolution-faqs/ (last visited July 15, 2015); see also
John Gamble, Facebook & TRUSTe, TRUSTE BLOG (May 12, 2010),
http://www.truste.com/blog/2010/05/12/facebook-truste/ (noting Facebook and TRUSTe's
business relationship).
272. Dispute Resolution FAQ's: What Constitutes an Ineligible Complaint?,
TRUS TE, https://www.truste.com/consumer-resources/dispute-resolution/dispute-
resolution-faqs/ (last visited July 23, 2015).
273. Id.
274. Id. Parties must first make a good faith attempt to resolve the privacy issue
directly, and if that fails, then TRUSTe will facilitate settlement through email
communications. Id.
Based upon the facts of a particular complaint, TRUSTe may do any or
all of the following: require the Client to either correct or modify
personally identifiable information, or change user preferences; require
the Client to change its privacy statement or privacy practice; require
the Client to submit to a third-party audit of its privacy practices to
ensure both the validity of its privacy statement and that it has
implemented the corrective action that TRUSTe required.
Id. If TRUSTe makes a determination on the issue, then it can require the party deemed to
have violated privacy rights to take corrective actions. If that party does not comply,
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A global view nonetheless suggests that ODR is the wave of the future.
Merchants outside of the United States have embraced ODR, especially due to its
ability to transcend borders and jurisdictional tensions. For example, the large
online retailer Alibaba uses an ODR mechanism for resolution of buyer and seller
275disputes. Under the program, either party may submit a complaint to Alibaba,
and if parties do not resolve it within ten days, then the parties may refer the
dispute to Alibaba's online "Dispute Resolution Team."276 Alibaba will then make
277
a determination based on evidence provided by both parties. Penalties for
noncompliance with determinations can be severe. Alibaba may terminate parties
from the site if they fail to abide by determinations on claims over $300, and for
claims of less than $300, Alibaba publishes a complaint case record on the
278
recalcitrant party's page on Alibaba.com for 90 days.
C. ODR Crafted to Overcome Obstacles
Given the benefits of ODR, it seems surprising that it has not become the
norm for resolving consumers' B2C disputes. Developing ODR systems, however,
comes with challenges and costs, and any use of technology can be problematic
due to system glitches and security hazards. 2 7 9 Creating and maintaining robust
TRUSTe may refer the matter to an appropriate government agency, remove it from the
TRUSTe program, and/or sue the party for breach of its License Agreement with TRUSTe.
Dispute Resolution FAQ's: What Remedies Are Available to Me as a Complainant?,
TRUSTE, https://www.truste.com/consumer-resources/dispute-resolution/dispute-
resolution-faqs/ (last visited July 23, 2015).
275. Definitions of Dispute and Resolution by Alibaba.com, ALIBABA,




279. For example, one consumer shared his frustrations with eBay's ODR
process:
On March 7, 2015, I ordered a power window regulator for my 1977
Mercedes from an outfit down in Tampa, Florida. I attempted to install
it the following weekend only to find that they sent me the wrong item.
I emailed the vendor with a picture on March 18 describing the issue
and kindly asking them to send me the correct item. They did not
respond. On March 19, I initiated a return with eBay. eBay's return
policy asks customers to wait for a response for five days before
'ask[ing] us to step in and help,' so I waited five days. The next step
requires the customer to ship the item back to the vendor (at cost to the
consumer, which was about $20), which I did, and submit the shipping
tracking number to eBay. The problem came at this step. I had the
USPS tracking number but every time I entered it on eBay, I received
the same message saying, 'Invalid parameter input.' I tried the shipping
number with spaces, without spaces, etc. Finally I had to call eBay's
customer service number, which is almost impossible to find, and I gave
the tracking number to the customer service representative over the
phone. I finally received my refund of $79.99 on March 31.
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and fair ODR systems is not entirely free. Moreover, consumers and companies are
slow to embrace change, and emerging algorithmic and other ODR techniques
raise new ethical dilemmas for dispute resolution designers, providers, and
practitioners.
1. No Truly Free Ride
ODR provides clear cost and efficiency benefits, but is not entirely "free"
with respect to its development and maintenance, or the time required to
understand and utilize the process. Adopting sound ODR systems requires
businesses and ODR developers to invest time and money in creating and
maintaining these systems. For example, companies seeking to adopt ODR
programs must hire design professionals and outside providers to create and
implement programs geared for their businesses.280 This is an investment and it
may take time before companies see the positive returns on their ODR systems.
For example, eBay did not immediately see the financial benefits of its investment
2811in ODR; it had to trust that the investment would pay off-easier said than done.
Some companies also may increase prices, lower product quality, or
otherwise pass on any costs of the ODR systems. They may even use ODR
systems to further ration remedies. For example, a company that once allowed for
automatic returns based on a "customer is always right" mentality may use an
ODR procedure to filter attempted returns to assure their legitimacy. That may
anger those consumers who are unable to make returns, but it could benefit
consumers more broadly by curbing costs of fraudulent returns. Instead of the
squeakiest wheels getting what they want by leveraging their power, the most
deserving consumers would have added access to remedies on their proper
complaints.
The costs of creating an ODR process also may seem wasted in certain
cases. There has been considerable backlash against pre-dispute clauses that
282preclude litigation in consumer contracts, as a recent CFPB report indicates.
Businesses may therefore opt to create nonbinding ODR systems. This means that
companies could continue to pay the costs associated with class actions or other
final resolution processes when nonbinding ODR does not succeed in ending a
dispute. Furthermore, they will still need to shoulder costs of staffing customer
service call centers-at least while they aim to transition to use of an efficient
ODR process. However, as noted earlier, development of such ODR systems will
ultimately benefit businesses by garnering goodwill and building solid customer
bases.
E-mail from Alex Gano, Research Assistant, to Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Colo. Sch. of Law (July 14, 2015) (on file with author) (adding that this led him to eschew
the process).
280. See Schmitz, Drive-Thru, supra note 232, at 180-240.
281. Rule, supra note 247, at 1-10; Louis F. Del Duca et al., eBay's De Facto
Low Value High Volume Resolution Process: Lessons and Best Practices for ODR Systems
Designers, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 204 (2014).
282. CONSUMER FiN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 144.
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2. Changing a Norm and Addressing the Digital Divide
Again, individuals are inert and slow to adopt new behaviors. This is
especially true when it requires people to learn something new. Consider the last
time you drove a new route to work or learned a new language. The urge to cling
to the familiar is even stronger when it comes to what we consider "justice." The
reigning business strategy regarding consumer claims has been to clamp down
class actions and halt complaints from reaching the public eye. This has led to the
use of arbitration clauses and reduced consumer access to remedies, as noted
above.283
Businesses, nonetheless, aim to garner customer loyalty and fend off
government enforcement actions and fines. As noted, businesses build goodwill by
providing customer assistance. Furthermore, regulators such as the CFPB and
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") have stepped up enforcement actions against
businesses that defy consumer protection laws and fail to provide consumers with
relief regarding B2C dealings.284 It is, therefore, wise for businesses to invest in
development and implementation of ODR systems built to provide better customer
assistance. As mentioned above, most consumers do not conceive of their purchase
285problems in legal terms; they simply want assistance.
Nonetheless, new ODR systems must be transparent and fair to attract
consumers and convince them of ODR's efficacy. Consumers also may resist ODR
systems out of fear that businesses have an advantage in any processes that they
create and in which they act as repeat players. In addition, new technologies
involved in ODR systems may intimidate consumers, especially seniors and other
groups that did not grow up using computers, cell phones, and other similar
technologies.286
It is therefore important to ensure neutrality of ODR programs and
educate consumers on the ODR programs. This will require ODR providers,
government regulators, and companies that implement ODR to collaborate in
spreading the word about ODR and providing user-friendly tutorials. To date, lack
of consumer awareness and understanding regarding ODR has stymied public
287
support. For example, ODR initiatives, such as the Virtual Magistrate Project or
the Online Mediation Project were unable to survive due to a general lack of public
awareness. 288 It is therefore essential to provide clear and straightforward
283. See supra text accompanying notes 1-19.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 34-46.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40 (noting research indicating how
consumers do not think of their contract issues as legal, and thus refrain from taking legal
action although it may be their only means for a remedy).
286. See KATHRYN ZICKUHR & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., DIGITAL
DIFFERENCES 14-21 (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media//Files/Reports/2012/PIPDigitalIdifferences_041312.pdf (noting the digital divide
among certain demographic groups including age, education, and socioeconomic status).
287. Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business:
Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for
B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 441, 458-59 (2002).
288. Id.
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information about ODR. 289 An ODR process should be fast, easy, and
unintimidating.
ODR reforms also must account for the "digital divide" in terms of
consumers' differential access to the Internet. Despite an increase in the number of
individuals and households who have internet access, the digital divide persists
based primarily on educational attainment, age, and household income. 290
Smartphone use has offered an alternative means to access and has helped narrow
the divide, especially with respect to race and ethnicity. 291 Nonetheless, age and
educational attainment still create a noticeable divide among smartphone users,
292
and access to data usage depends on economic means.
For example, the Pew Research Center ("PRC") found, in its 2013 study
of broadband use, that approximately 70% of adults had a high-speed broadband
293
connection to the Internet, while 3% had a home dial-up connection. Home











No high school diploma 37%








289. Id. (noting how lack of awareness hindered eBay's success of a pilot ODR
project using voluntary online mediation through the "Online Ombuds Office").
290. THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf.
291. KATHRYN ZICKUHR & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., HOME
BROADBAND 2013, at 4-5 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media//Files/Reports/2013/PIPBroadband%202013_082613.pdf.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 2.
294. Id. at 2-3.
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However, the PRC also found that smartphone usage has created new
means for accessing the Internet, especially for minority groups and those with
295lower economic means. For example, 10% of Americans do not have home
broadband internet access, but they do own a smartphone.2 96 Smartphones also
virtually eliminate the digital divide among races and ethnicities, with 80% of
"White, Non-Hispanic," 79% of "Black, Non-Hispanic," and 75% of "Hispanic"
having some internet access through home broadband or a smartphone. 2 97 Still,
smartphones widen the digital divide between 18-29 year olds and those who are
over age 65 (increasing from a gap of 37 percentage points in home broadband
access to 49 percentage points when taking smartphones into account). 298
Furthermore, although smartphones have increased their utility with the advent of
new technologies, they may not be as usable as a computer with a home internet
connection-i.e., uploading and editing documents, and costs of data usage under
299
smartphone plans may hinder access for those of lower economic means.
It is expected that the digital divide will continue to shrink.3 00 The U.S.
Census Bureau noted how quickly individuals have gained access to the Internet in
301its 2011 study tracking internet use over time. It found that in 1984 only 8.2% of
American adults had a computer, while that number rose to 75.6% in 2011.
Additionally, only 18.0% of Americans had access to the Internet in 1997
compared with 71.7% in 2011.302 However, the study also acknowledged that a
digital divide exists based on race and ethnicity. 3 0 3




299. See id. at 4 (noting questions regarding the utility of smartphones for
activities such as updating a resume, filing taxes, or viewing educational content because
these activities are more challenging on a smartphone operating over a cell phone network
than on a broadband-connected home computer).
300. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, MAPPING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 2
tbl.1 (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/wh-digital-divide-issue-brief.pdf.
301. FILE, supra note 290, at 1.
302. Id. at 2.
303. Id. at 3 fig.2.
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Figure 2.
Household Internet Use by Race and Ethnicity: 2000-2011
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The Census Bureau's findings mirrored those of the PRC; finding that
smartphone usage helped to somewhat narrow the digital divide based on race and
ethnicity. 304
Still, the Census Bureau reported differential access based on age (18-34
-82% versus 65+ = 45.5%), income (less than $25,000 = 49.8%, $25,000-
$49,999 = 63.7%, and $100,000+ = -86%), and educational attainment (less than
high school graduate = 3 1.5%; high school graduate or GED = 58.7%; some
college or associate's degree = 80.7%; bachelor's degree or higher = 90.0%). 305
Furthermore, the Census Bureau noted that the Southeastern and Northeastern
parts of the United States experienced smartphone usage below the national
average, while most states west of the Mississippi enjoyed usage rates at or higher
than the national average. 3oNotably, the technological devices used in ODR
processes, such as computers, smart phones, and tablets come with costs, as do
telecommunications services for home and cellular devices. This means that many
consumers, especially those in vulnerable populations, may continue to feel
disempowered in the digital age.
304. Id. at 10-12.
305. Id. at 4 5. With respect to smartphones, the Census Bureau found usage as
follows: white, non-Hispanic alone: 48.6%; black alone: 47.3%; Asian alone: 51.6%;
Hispanic: 45.4%. Id. at 11 tbl.5. When taking into account either smartphone or internet
users, the Census Bureau found internet usage rates as follows: white, non-Hispanic alone:
79.2%; black alone: 67.9%; Asian alone: 83.0%; Hispanic: 65.5% (changing the gap from
27 percentage points among Asian and Hispanic internet users, to 18 percentage points
when accounting for smartphones). Id.
306. Id.
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Accordingly, policymakers and businesses must consider ways to expand
free or low-cost internet access.30 7 They also would be wise to adopt educational
access programs to assist those over age 65 and those with lower education. Most
consumers will need to invest some time and resources in gathering information
about new ODR processes. Furthermore, using ODR will be more difficult for
those who are uncomfortable with online processes and grew up in a society that
relied on F2F discussions and "cowboy contract" handshakes to ensure the quality
of their deals.3 0 8
Nonetheless, seniors are becoming more internet savvy, and there are
programs aimed at providing internet assistance and access. For example, the City
of Lafayette Senior Center in Colorado offers free computer classes, clinics, and
labs. 3 0 9 Such facilities could provide ODR tutorials and "ODR stations" set up
with computers. These ODR stations could also be at libraries and other public
buildings with assistants to walk individuals through the process. Businesses that
use ODR also could provide assistance for consumers, and cover related costs with
savings from cutbacks on other means of customer support. They also may happily
cover the costs due to gains they will enjoy from boosting goodwill. Public
assistance and donations could defray any additional costs and would be worth the
investment to help fill the gap left by the digital divide and expand access to
remedies for consumers regardless of wealth, education, or other status.
Of course, some consumers may remain silent about their claims
regardless of the remedy processes available. Psychological and behavioral
barriers to pursuing remedies may continue to hinder some consumers from
complaining, and others may remain unwilling to learn about or use new ODR
systems. That does not mean, however, that policymakers and businesses should
abandon reform ideas. Expanded access to consumer justice is worth the
investment in making a change.
3. Privacy Perils
Consumers also may distrust that the information they convey through an
ODR process will remain private. As noted above, there is growing concern with
Big Data companies' intrusion into our privacy.3 1 0 Consumer trust in the Internet is
declining amidst stories of rampant hacking scandals. Policymakers have also
become increasingly concerned with the usage of consumer information to provide
307. See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz, F. C. C. Chief Seeks Broadband Plan to Aid the
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2015, at Al (discussing plan to expand access to the Internet for
the poor).
308. See Braucher, supra note 218, at 191-98 (discussing "cowboy contracts"
sealed by a handshake).
309. Adult Programs - Technology Classes Fall 2015, CITY OF LAFAYETTE,
COLO., http://www.cityoflafayette.com/DocumentCenter/View/7054 (last visited Feb. 29,
2016) (discussing the various classes and computer labs, including classes on using Google,
smartphones, etc.).
310. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of Big
Data and its allowance for differential treatment of consumers with respect to pricing and
remedies).
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consumers with different deals depending on data brokers' assessment of an
311individual's value as a potential or current customer.
Full discussion of data privacy is an expansive issue beyond the scope of
312this Article. However, it is important in the ODR context to address consumers'
fear that the information they submit in an ODR process will not remain secure.
For example, a consumer may fear that any documents that they submit online
could reach the wrong hands-such as fraudsters mining the Internet for personal
financial data. Consumers also may worry that businesses may retaliate against
them for filing an ODR claim by dropping or avoiding them as a customer.
Fair use of data and data privacy are concerns with any website or online
system. Forty-seven percent of respondents in a recent survey said they were
concerned with companies tracking their behavior online. 313 "Consumer data
companies are scooping up huge amounts of consumer information" and "selling
it, providing marketers details about whether you're pregnant or divorced or trying
to lose weight, about how rich you are and what kinds of cars you drive."314 Data
brokers track online purchases, use of store loyalty cards, how long one lingers on
a website, online searching histories, family information, and even postings on
315
social sites such as Facebook. It is thus unsurprising that consumers are 74%
316
more concerned with their online privacy than they were a year ago.
However, ODR systems designers already have begun developing robust
317
means for protecting privacy and encrypting data. For example, Modria, a
leading ODR provider, uses sophisticated encryption and other data safety
318
mechanisms to ensure the safety of its services. In fact, such websites are
generally safer than most B2C sites, especially those that unabashedly collect and
sell user data.3 19 There is, therefore, no reason to fear provision of information
311. See Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data's Different
Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 50-52 (2013).
312. For a discussion of data brokers' practices and suggestions of privacy
regulations addressing problems associated with those practices, see Schmitz, Secret
Consumer, supra note 17, at 1411-73.
313. TRUSTE INC., TRUSTE 2014 U.S. CONSUMER CONFIDENCE PRIVACY
REPORT: CONSUMER OPINION AND BUSINESS IMPACT 3 (2014),
http://download.truste.com/dload.php/?f=4HKV87KT-447 [hereinafter TRUSTE REPORT].
Concerns about tracking have escalated among those aged 55-64, and is higher among
married than single persons. Id. at 7.
314. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About
You, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-
we-know-about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you.
315. TRUSTE REPORT, supra note 313, at 3-10.
316. Id. at 7-10.
317. COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS: B2B, E-
COMMERCE, CONSUMER, EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL CONFLICTS
199-201 (2004).
318. See Security, MODRIA, http://modria.com/security/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016)
(describing the ODR provider's compliance with international information security




through ODR platforms to any degree greater than that of using the Internet
generally.
Furthermore, consumers may not be as concerned with provision of
information over the Internet if the end goal is to obtain a remedy. "Few people
make the effort to read [privacy policies]. Similarly, empirical evidence suggests
that consumers do not fully understand the meaning of privacy seals." 3 2 0 Instead,
studies have indicated that most people are willing to put aside privacy concerns
321
and provide personal information for even small rewards.
That said, transparency is of paramount importance in challenging the
F2F norm for claims resolution. Individuals using ODR services must trust that the
ODR platforms protect their privacy. Users also must feel that the ODR services
use decision-making processes that consider their views. For example, some
consumers may not trust an algorithmic ODR mechanism that feels like simple
number swapping. That is why ODR processes that spit out settlements based on
algorithms using data on similar claims are not necessarily just in all cases or for
all parties.322 It is therefore essential to build ODR systems for particular contexts
in consideration of due-process standards.
4. Evolving Ethical Dilemmas
The importance of ODR due-process standards coincides with the need
for specialized ethics rules to address the new and evolving dilemmas ODR creates
for systems designers, providers, and third-party neutrals. Some commentators
323
argue that ODR providers will focus on speed to the detriment of due process.
They also worry that private ODR providers will favor the businesses that hire
them and pay the bill for their services. 3 24 Furthermore, even if providers are not in
fact biased, consumers may nonetheless remain skeptical that the businesses are
repeat players who have mastered use of the ODR systems for their benefit.
Related concerns have led to more public ODR regulations and programs
outside of the United States. For example, the European Union adopted a Directive
325
on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and a Regulation on
326Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes, which work in tandem to
require member states to implement ODR systems for resolving consumer claims.
Furthermore, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law is
320. Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing
Behavior: An Experimental Study, in THE 6TH WORKSHOP ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION SECURITY 1 (2007),
http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2007/papers/57.pdf (internal citations omitted).
321. Id. at 2.
322. See Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Technology, Ethics, and
Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 486,
492 (2014).
323. See id. at 518.
324. See id. at 519-20.
325. Council Directive 2013/11/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63.
326. Commission Regulation 524/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 1.
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currently advancing guidelines on ODR for cross-border e-commerce through its
Working Group III on Online Dispute Resolution.327
However, ODR has remained private in the United States, and the private
ODR providers, such as Modria, should play a pivotal role in creating robust ODR
328
systems in the United States. Private ODR providers have the necessary
expertise and already lead the way in creating safe and fair ODR systems. Unlike
the government, these private companies have the necessary tools to efficiently
and effectively build ODR frameworks, which ultimately benefits all taxpayers.
Nonetheless, these private entities must work in collaboration with government
regulators and other public entities to ensure system fairness. This should include
implementation of rules for independent review and accreditation of ODR
programs, which again could be linked with a government-backed trustmark.3 2 9
Furthermore, ODR practitioners (including lawyers and nonlawyers, and
ranging from advisors to mediators and arbitrators) who utilize CMC should create
and follow ethical standards that account for technology with regard to
confidentiality, impartiality, competence, and quality of process.3 3 0 ODR designers
also must consider how technology allows for outside parties to essentially "spy"
on an ODR process through compromised e-mails, cloud computing platforms, and
penetrable chat rooms.3 3 1 Practitioners must understand these confidentiality risks
332
and communicate those risks to clients. As noted above, ODR systems designers
also must remain vigilant in creating robust security measures to prevent data
security breaches during the process.33 3
327. Int'l Law Comm'n, Trade Law Working Grp. III, Online Dispute Resolution
for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions: Draft Guidelines, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.128 (Apr. 4, 2014).
328. See Interview by Aled Davies with Colin Rule, Founder and COO,
Modria.com (2015), http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/colin rule modria os-for odr.pdf (discussing the history and
growth of private ODR providers).
329. ODR providers are already learning the importance of creating just and
legitimate systems. They know that government regulators may shut them down if they
favor the companies that hire them. The National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") shutdown
with respect to F2F consumer arbitration provides a cautionary tale. This arbitration
provider halted its consumer arbitration services pursuant to a settlement of a lawsuit the
Minnesota Attorney General filed against NAF for consumer fraud, deceptive trade
practices, and false advertising. See Robert Berner, Big Arbitration Firm Pulls Out of Credit
Card Business, BUSINESSWEEK (July 19, 2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/investing/wall-streetnews-blog/archives/2009/07/big-arbit
ration.html (discussing the lawsuit against NAF and the large impact this will have on credit
card and other consumer arbitrations NAF has administered in the past).
330. Daniel Rainey, Third-Party Ethics in the Age of the Fourth Party, 1 INT'LJ.
Disp. RESOL. 37, 56 (2014).
331. See generally Esther Van den Heuvel, Online Dispute Resolution as a
Solution to Cross-Border E-disputes (2000),
http://www.oecd.org/intemet/consumer/1878940.pdf (discussing foreseeable privacy
concerns in ODR).
332. Rainey, supra note 330, at 45.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 317-22.
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Additionally, the neutrals facilitating or deciding ODR cases must be
forthright with clients in explaining the pros and cons of ODR and ensuring
parties' right to self-determination. They should be vigilant in ensuring that all
parties have an adequate opportunity to participate in the process and that parties
can make free, voluntary, and informed choices surrounding the procedures and
334
outcome. This should be true in F2F dispute resolution as well, but may be more
of a concern in ODR because there will be more nonlawyers involved in deciding
or facilitating ODR disputes.3 3 5 ODR facilitators also must be more careful than
F2F dispute resolution neutrals to remain focused on cases submitted online. It is
easier to be distracted by email and outside surroundings while facilitating a case
behind the comfort of one's computer than facing the disputing parties in a
conference room.
Standards also must clarify when ODR neutrals should withdraw from an
online case for ethical reasons. Ethics rules usually require a third-party neutral in
dispute resolution to withdraw from a case when actual bias or the appearance of
bias threatens to undermine the integrity of the process. 336 This is easier to
determine in a typical F2F process because neutrals generally have sufficient facts
about parties' identities and time to investigate possible conflicts of interest and
disclose those conflicts at the outset of a process. For example, arbitrators must
determine and disclose all conflicts of interest at the outset of an arbitration, thus
giving the parties freedom of choice with respect to the arbitrator.3 37
In contrast, ODR neutrals may not know parties' identities at the outset
due to well-meaning technological devices that seek to preserve anonymity. 338
This can be beneficial when ODR allows for true anonymity, which may prevent
parties and neutrals from ever knowing the others' identities. This would prevent
conflicts of interest from thwarting the dispute resolution process. However, there
may be some cases in which parties mistakenly reveal their identities through their
presentation of the facts. This could result in last-minute withdrawal of the online
neutral, thus derailing the process.
For example, an ODR mediator may not know parties' names at the
outset of an ostensibly anonymous process. However, the content of parties'
statements or even the tone of communications may reveal identities. Consumers
and companies may inevitably disclose their identities while submitting relevant
documents or explaining the facts. Accordingly, new ethical standards for ODR
334. Rainey, supra note 330, at 46.
335. See Douglas H. Yam, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of
Ethics 2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for
Adoption and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REv. 207, 211-12 (2001).
336. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (AM. LAW INST.
2011) ("A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and
diligently.").
337. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard III (AM. LAW
INST. 2005).
338. Colin Rule & Indu Sen, Online Dispute Resolution and Ombuds: Bringing
Technology to the Table, 8 J. INT'L OMBUDSMAN Ass'N 73, 78-79
(2015), https://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOAMain/media/SiteFiles/docs/JIOA-15-V8-
1-RuleSen.pdf.
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should address these situations. There already is a lack of uniform standards and
accreditations for F2F mediators, and therefore, this impetus may inspire action to
339
ensure legitimacy of all mediation processes.
In addition, ODR raises new questions about the unauthorized practice of
law. Nonlawyer dispute resolution providers have long struggled with avoiding the
unauthorized practice of law.340 The growth of ODR makes this more complicated
by introducing more nonlawyers into dispute resolution processes. Furthermore,
individuals may not be as careful in the online communications to avoid giving
legal advice, or otherwise crossing over the line and practicing law.
ODR providers also must be careful not to over-automate their processes
341in the name of efficiency. Cost and time savings are important ODR goals, but
342
they should not overshadow fairness and justice. ODR designers must safeguard
due process and be careful in creating and using algorithms to decide disputes
based on models that may not fit a particular case or context. Some parties may
enjoy the speed of code-based claim determinations, but others may feel
dissatisfied by any process that feels like actuarially determined number
343
swapping.
Still, ODR developers and providers, in collaboration with government
regulators, can overcome these hurdles and develop fair and ethical ODR systems.
Consumers are eager to use technology in new ways, especially if that will help
them obtain remedies with respect to their B2C claims. They seek economical and
easy ways to obtain redress when products do not conform to their expectations or
when businesses fail to provide the services they promise. Accredited and
monitored ODR systems may offer access to remedies they desire. The businesses
that employ these systems also would benefit by saving dispute resolution costs
and building goodwill among their customers.
5. Ensuring Enforcement of Public Rights
Private companies may play a part in creating ODR processes, but as
suggested above, government regulators, such as the CFPB, must play a role in
ensuring the fairness of these privately created processes. Additionally, it is
essential to promote enforcement of consumer protection laws and other public
rights. As discussed above, the demise of class actions has arguably left businesses
free to avoid enforcement of these rights. 3 44 At first glimpse, ODR may further
privatize claims resolution-thereby putting a nail in the coffin on public
enforcement of consumer laws. Accordingly, ODR systems should add a "trigger
mechanism" that would (1) alert regulators about recurring claims indicating
possible grounds for enforcement action; and (2) result in a public posting on a
339. See Yam, supra note 335, at 207-11 (noting need for updated ethical rules).
340. Id.
341. Scott J. Shackelford & Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual
Courthouse: Ethical Considerations for Design, Implementation, and Regulation in the
World of ODR, 2014 Wis. L. REV. 615, 616.
342. Id. at 627-29, 640-45.
343. Id. at 647.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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central ODR website notifying other consumers of potential problems. This would
be especially important where repeated complaints indicate that health or safety
issues are at stake.
Specifically, the "trigger" could alert the CFPB or FTC, depending on the
type of product or service involved, when there are an inordinate number of claims
filed regarding a particular product or service that has harmed individuals in a
significant way. Such a trigger also could generate a public posting about the
recurring claims after the CFPB or FTC has verified the claims' legitimacy. This
would promote public awareness about a danger that may otherwise remain private
due to the SWS and the proliferation of pre-dispute arbitration clauses and class
action waivers.
The trigger mechanism would also benefit regulators by helping them
determine when to pursue enforcement actions. In this way, the trigger would help
address the underenforcement of statutory and other public policy claims that has
occurred due to the privatization of justice in B2C cases. For example, an ODR
process with a trigger mechanism would help alert the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") when particular telecommunications companies add
unauthorized third-party charges to customers' bills (a practice known as
"cramming").3 4 5 Although the FCC has brought some enforcement actions to stop
cramming, 34 6 many consumers continue to fall prey to these charges due to lack of
vigilance regarding small charges on their bills and their reliance on automatic
payment systems. Thus, ODR would lower consumers' hurdles to remedies, albeit
in a largely privatized process, while the trigger mechanism would prompt public
awareness and allow the FCC to notify a company to reverse unauthorized charges
or face an enforcement action.
It seems at first blush that no company would agree to use an ODR
platform that integrates the proposed trigger mechanism, as it could arouse
unwanted regulatory action. However, as noted above, use of the ODR process
could ease companies' overall dispute resolution costs making the entire process
more economically efficient. Additionally, the associated trustmark would
provide marketing benefits for companies that agree to the process. Furthermore,
companies' adherence to the ODR process could help them avoid any potential
enforcement actions and class claims.3 4 8
345. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ensuring Remedies to Cure Cramming, 14 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 877, 877-97 (2013).
346. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, FCC Proposes $5.2
Million Fine Against U.S. Telecom Long Distance, Inc., for Deceptive Slamming,
Cramming, and Billing Practices (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-
proposes-52-m-fine-against-us-telecom-long-distance-inc (highlighting the FCC's action
against a telecommunications company for changing consumers' long distance carriers and
adding charges without proper authorization).
347. See supra Section I.B.2.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 231-33.
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CONCLUSION
The costs and complexity of traditional F2F processes for resolving B2C
purchase problems have hindered consumers' access to remedies and enforcement
of consumer protection regulations. Legal rights on the books have become
meaningless for individuals living in the real world. This is especially true with
respect to low-dollar claims. It is rarely worth the cost and stress of pursuing F2F
processes when the expected recovery is low. Additionally, businesses rely on
individuals' inertia by curbing customer assistance and privately quieting claims of
the relatively few squeaky wheels who persistently pursue their complaints. This
leaves the majority of consumers unaware of their rights and unsatisfied when
purchases go awry.
This Article therefore suggests a need for considering "law in action," and
thus developing lower cost, easily accessible consumer remedy processes. Namely,
it advocates the development of ODR processes designed to revive corporate
responsibility and consumer trust in their purchases. These processes must be
secure, transparent, user friendly, and worth their costs in light of the complexity
and possible payout on the claims at issue. 3 4 9 Consumers also must have adequate
information about the ODR processes so that they are comfortable using these
processes to vindicate their rights. Furthermore, government regulations and an
enforcement mechanism should support ODR processes. This could result in a
win-win for consumers and companies. When companies provide such resolution
processes, "[c]onsumers are happier; they become more loyal; the bottom line
increases.
349. See Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally
Available?, 12 OTAGO L. REv. 305, 308-16 (2010).
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